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Big two thrash out the missiles equation

Frankfurter Allgemeine

...can now safely leave the Russians and the Americans to count ... in Geneva. Their intimacy on ... matters is one of the paradoxes ... affairs today.

...superpowers know more about ... other's missile armoury and swap information on the subject than ... are prepared to divulge to their ...

... feels it can breathe a sigh of re... the home front. There is a temp... to keep quiet about arms pros... especially as defence cuts must be ... to carry conviction.

... the truth is that if the Geneva ... talks are successful, defence is ... prove even costlier.

... theory the two blocs, East and ..., can implement at various levels ... ideas of parity to ensure the peace ...

... the highest level, that of anti-mis... missiles, both sides have agreed to ... the ABM agreement. A perfect ... missile system turned out to be just ... expensive.

... would have been like devising a ... as a second in a duel that was en... with the task of shooting down ... opponent's bullet before it reached ... target.

...ventional war, sad to say, or rather ... a conventional attack by means ... conventional armament, is the next ... expensive option.

... Americans have stated the un... truth in a nutshell by saying ... nukes are cheap. This slogan is ... the nuclear deterrent principle.

... Soviet attack using conventional ... were to succeed, Russia would ... the risk of a graduated nuclear re...

...atever may be said, no-one can ... what course the scenario might take and whether or not the ex... of nuclear blows might then es...

... American expert wrote in 1979 ... there was no point in using terms ... as deterrence as a kind of exor... as though it were some reassuring ... of liturgy.

... long as the exorcism worked, the ... distance between daily life ... nuclear reality could be maintained. ... this exorcism was only able to work as long as US nuclear supremacy seemed assured.

So what matters to the West is not only to achieve results in Geneva to calm humanity's savaged breast but also to agree on conditions that ensure the survival of the nuclear deterrent as a deterrent.

The theory of deterrence needs to be retrieved from the prayer wheel role. The public have long forgotten what its true significance is.

The US writer mentioned above, Fred Charles Iklé, is now a leading man in the Pentagon. "At the gates of Hell", he wrote, "the old eschatology would have scant consolation to offer."

The Soviet Union finds the West's one-sided, almost manic fixation on the nuclear aspect of matters more than convenient.

It is adding fuel to the fires of psychosis by raising issues such as a nuclear-free zone or the proscription of nuclear weapons.

The origins of the zero option concept remain to be clarified.

In concentrating so exclusively on nuclear matters the West is losing sight, at least in public discussion, of the need to arm conventionally.

The Soviet superiority in conventional armament, given a nuclear balance (always assuming one were struck), is the real threat to this country.

Smaller contemporary flare-ups readily highlight the possibility of changing the entire situation in Central Europe in a matter of days or hours.

The gains made by Israeli and Turkish tank advances in a few have been retained for years. The illusion of the United Nations as a world peacemaker accomplished no more than to freeze the status quo established by the initial attack.

UN resolutions of whatever kind have entirely failed to bring about any change after the event.

The United Nations has succeeded in arriving at an armistice but it has failed to secure peace and justice, although the examples cited may not necessarily apply to the situation in Central Europe.

But the warning note they sound does mean that below the threshold of nuclear balance we must take care to ensure a conventional balance of power and a conventional deterrent.



(Cartoon: Haitzinger/tz München)

The ability to conduct conventional defence assumes greater urgency the higher the nuclear threshold is located, and it could well be higher as the West's understanding of itself undergoes change.

Mass deployment of exactly targeted devices might, in military terms, demonstrate the West's technological superiority. In political terms it might be limited to defensive weapons.

This might be a way of preventing war of any kind, and nuclear war in particular. It might not be enough for ardent pacifists but it could well salve the consciences of normal patriots.

Yet even this expense would need to be met, and it would certainly call for well-trained soldiers. But there is no sign of the Federal Republic of Germany making the slightest mental preparation for any such priorities.

It was right to exert pressure on the Soviet Union to meet deadlines by adopting the December 1979 Nato resolution, but it was bad policy to worry people in this country with warnings of a war that was not an immediate threat.

This mistake cannot be made good solely by the next annual conference of the Social Democratic Party refraining from taking sides on the issue.

The Geneva talks provide a breathing space that ought to be used to strengthen the German desire for self-assertion. This is more important than either theories or arsenals, as France and Poland have shown.

Robert Held

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 5 December 1981)

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Spain applies to join Nato

Spain has applied to join Nato. It has long been linked with the North Atlantic pact in many ways via bilateral agreements with the United States.

The Nato Defence Ministers in Brussels view the prospect with mixed feelings. Spain will join the ranks of Nato countries hoping to benefit from this link with more affluent allies.

In material terms the United States and Western European Nato countries almost exclusively foot the military bills of Portugal, Greece and Turkey. Spain stands to join them.

The state of the Spanish armed forces is such that Nato staff are hardly jubilant.

It would be many years before the three Spanish divisions were equipped to the standards of other Nato armies.

The real gain Nato will make must be seen in terms of Spanish territory, which is extremely important for the defence of the Mediterranean.

The Spanish government is likely to insist on certain restrictions in military activities from Spanish territory so as not to jeopardise its cordial relations with the Arab states of North Africa.

Similar provisions were included in the agreements between Spain and the United States, but have not in practice led to much in the way of difficulties.

All told, Spanish accession to Nato is a gain. Once it is a member the entire northern coastline of the Mediterranean from Adana in Turkey to Faro in Portugal will be in Nato's hands.

This presupposes Greece remaining a member. But there can be no doubt whatever that Nato leaders will be happy to extend the invitation Madrid hopes to be given.

Wolfgang Fechner

(Nordwest Zeitung, 4 December 1981)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Military balance: all pawns are not equal

Why does the West need special medium-range missiles? Can the superpowers not make do with a sevenfold capacity to wipe each other out?

This is the most frequent doubt voiced over over Nato's deploy-and-negotiate resolution in December 1979 spelling out the terms of missile modernisation.

Nato has always argued that there was a need to strike a balance in medium-range missiles and to create an atmosphere in which the Soviet Union would be inclined toward disarmament.

But the doubts go further. Is there any such thing as a balance of power? It can certainly not be quantified.

On a pair of scales balance means an equal weight on both sides. To attain a physical balance it is immaterial what specific weights make up the total on either side.

All that matters is that their combined weight is equal.

To strike a military balance more is involved than the sum total of individual weights. The quality of system each side lays in the scales also counts.

Each weapon is particularly well suited for specific tasks and unsuitable for others. A fleet can blockade sea links but it cannot occupy land.

Cavalry can carry out a fast attack on flat terrain but it cannot dislodge infantry from impassable country.

Thus defence must be planned using a combination of weapons because various modes of defence are required to deal with various kinds of attack.

A further problem is that at sea there is no need for the United States to share with European governments its power of disposal over missile capacity.

If Europe would like a say in US nuclear strategy in war and peace and to influence US deployment planning it will have to state a good case why it should do so.

In an international crisis the US President can only be expected to discuss the use of American nuclear weapons with Western European countries that have played a relevant political role by allowing US missiles to be stationed on their territory.

Last not least, there are telling psychological reasons why medium-range missiles should be stationed in Western Europe, especially the impression this is likely to make on the Soviet leaders.

The result is an interface between various weapons systems, with the advantages of one category offsetting the disadvantages of another.

Security will be ensured for only as long as there are no weaknesses or shortcomings in the defence system.

By the same token there has to be a wide range of nuclear defence devices in various sizes, ranges and forms of delivery.

In chess there are situations in which a threat can be countered neither by the rook nor by the bishop nor by the pawns in joint harness, not even by a combination of the three.

This is the sort of situation in which an in-between figure, a chessman with powers of movement midway between those of the rook and the bishop, is called for; a situation in which the knight, and only the knight, will do.

As the Soviet Union has stepped up its medium-range missile armament a corresponding situation has arisen in respect of the West's defence capacity.

This gap can be bridged neither by conventional weapons nor by intercontinental ballistic missiles, which tend in any case to cancel each other out.

It is a special threat that simply cannot be dealt with by adding up the sum total of nuclear destruction potential, not even if the result is a sevenfold overkill capacity.

Overkill is a specious argument that makes out a complicated state of affairs to be an absurdity.

To fail to grasp the twofold political effect of weapons systems would be to fail to understand the quintessence of the balance of power.

The one is the direct effect they would have when used in hostilities, this being the exception, not the rule. The other is their indirect effect, their everyday deterrent effect.

Even when not actually deployed, military potential casts a long shadow which, in psycho-strategic terms, is useful for purposes of attack and defence, to upset the other side or to reassure one's own.

Balance of power means ensuring that an adversary stands no chance of successfully launching an offensive anywhere. In the terminology of security policy, all offensive options must be blocked.

Balance of power does not call on one side to do exactly what the other does. Blocking options is what counts.

If the Soviet Union is convinced it needs at least three or four times as much armour as the West to launch a successful conventional attack in Europe, an attack in which it retains supremacy with a minimum of losses, then little is needed to block this option.

All the West needs to do is to stage an arms build-up that ensures it has at least a third of the Soviet arms capacity.

Or say the Soviet Union feels it has an option of cutting the West off from commodity sources in the Middle East, either by arms exports, by using supporting armies or by sending in troops of its own.

The option would have to be blocked by diplomatic bids to enlist the support of allies in the region or by setting up a rapid deployment force.

As for intercontinental ballistic warfare, this particular option has been blocked for years by approximate parity, as formalised by the terms of Salt 1 and 2.

An option that has yet to be blocked is the medium-range missile superiority the Soviet Union has been busy trying to establish.

To block it the Nato countries need neither to equip themselves with the same kind of weapons nor to deploy an equal number of missiles.

Nato's proposed 572 Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles will have only half the range of Russia's SS-20s and only one warhead in contrast to the Soviet missiles' three.

For the most part they will not, unlike the Soviet missiles, be suitable for preventive use. Nato will certainly stay well below the arms level of the Soviet Union.

Yet the 572 proposed Nato counterparts will be enough to block the Soviet medium-range missile option, and this being so, a smaller number in the West is desirable.

It is Nato's way of showing that the West's sole strategic aim is to hold its own.

Günther Gillessen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 December 1981)

Iron ring binds crumbling East Bloc together

Many Eastern Europe watchers do more than studiously avoid using the term East Bloc; they warn against using it at all.

To talk in terms of an East Bloc is said to be derogatory in relation to the peoples of Eastern Europe.

It arguably makes them out to be indistinguishable parts of a single clod, denies their individuality and is a blow ot their self-awareness.

This is, of course, an argument worth making, but objections promptly come to mind.

The continued existence of the peoples of Eastern Europe is in no way called into question by using a handy catchphrase for the Soviet empire to which they for decades have belonged.

It could be dangerous for the West, having already ruled out so many terms to denote its own state of affairs, to verbally rule out dangerous realities of the outside world.

This would be a self-deception that could fast progress from verbal redundancy to redundancy in thought processes too.

So if such a thing as the East Bloc exists, we must call it by its name. But does it? A look at Eastern Europe today could easily lead one to doubt the fact.

The Soviet Union's western approaches look a craggy landscape. In neighbouring Poland the Communist Party's hold over the country has been so vitiated for the past 15 months that the Kremlin might well be reluctant to classify the country as socialist, let alone communist.

Alongside the Party there are two other forces that are its equal in terms of actual power. They are the independent trade union movement and the Roman Catholic Church.

The trade union enjoys mass support and matters are made no easier for the Soviet Union by the fact that the third force, the Church, favours domestic peace and is keen to mediate between the Party and the trade union movement.

This makes the Church even more than it has been in the past the true voice of the Polish nation.

The Soviet Union could long since have used force to end what it can but feel is a nightmare. It still might do so. But it has stopped short because it is at a loss what to do with an occupied Poland.

The situation in Poland today is entirely out of joint from the Soviet point of view but Russia fails to see how it could replace it with a Leninist system that worked and was not just proclaimed.

The power question alone is what has dissuaded the Kremlin from invading Poland so far, and not power in the world as a whole or in terms of East-West ties but power in Poland alone.

Provided the situation remains unchanged, and Moscow's realistic assessment of it too, this might continue to be the case.

When all this is taken into account one can only reluctantly say that Poland is a country that forms part of the Soviet bloc.

Poland today is in a class of its own and without precedent. When the Soviet Union waited months in 1968 before invading Czechoslovakia, it was not because it could not see how it planned to handle Czechoslovakia once it w[...] cupied.

Moscow well knew, in broad o[...] what it had in mind once the c[...] was under Warsaw Pact occupation [...] it went on to do it.

What held the Kremlin back in [...] was the damage an invasion of Cz[...] lovakia might do to detente, to the [...] the United States and to the inte[...] nal communist movement.

But soon enough the Soviet [...] felt this damage would be negligi[...] comparison with what they felt [...] happen if they were to allow the en[...] of Czech reform communism to s[...] der on.

Moscow then marched in, and t[...] day the Soviet leaders can have f[...] regrets at having taken this decision.

On the surface Czechoslovakia seems to be peaceful enough, bu[...] Moscow politbureau can be in no [...] as to the ill-will that has accumula[...] the country since 1968.

In East Germany, in contrast, a [...] ture of the national question and [...] desire for freedom makes it impo[...] for Leninist rule to consolidate itself [...] a permanent basis.

Neither is actively embraced, but [...] overwhelming majority of East Ger[...] are politically aware enough to wa[...] see both issues settled.

So the Soviet Union cannot feel [...] in the GDR, its major satellite, a r[...] supporter.

In the mid-60s and later, in th[...] there was talk in Eastern Europe [...] iron triangle linking East Berlin, [...] and Prague. Not much is left of it.

In the southern sector of the [...] Bloc Rumania has been trying for [...] 20 years to withdraw from the bloc [...] only the Rumanian leaders had pu[...] domestic policies that enjoyed do[...] support the Russians would now [...] good reason to be as worried about [...] velopments in Rumania as they [...] about the course of the events in [...] land. In Hungary Mr Kadar has pu[...] much more far-sighted domestic [...] licies, yet that does not prevent [...] Hungarians from feeling increas[...] close ties with the West and increas[...] distant ones from the Soviet Union.

So there can be no question of [...] East Bloc that backs the Soviet Uni[...] the hilt.

What makes it a bloc is the pre[...] or threat of Soviet military migh[...]

It is held together not by powe[...] inner cohesion but by an iron ring [...] posed from without.

Johann Georg Reissmü[...]

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [...] für Deutschland, 4 December [...])

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POLITICS

Foreign policy successes give the coalition a boost

[...]ermany's domestic political scene [...]has changed fundamentally since [...] visit to Bonn last month of Soviet [...] chief Brezhnev.

[...]he foreign policy successes of the [...]/FDP coalition have stabilised the [...]rnment so much that the opposition [...]ded in a Bundestag debate to avoid [...] attack.

[...]stead it concentrated on emphasising [...]mon ground.

[...]his new-found stability comes after [...]nths of tortuous disputes that [...]ght the governing partners to the [...] of break up.

[...]elmut Schmidt has been confirmed [...] his policy of patiently exerting his in[...]nce on the superpowers. Now he can reap the fruits of his labours.

[...]he only course of action open to the [...]U/CSU at the moment is to try and widen the rift between the Chancellor and his party as much as possible.

The SPD is not exactly making it hard on the opposition to drive in the wedge. This is a fact Schmidt will have to live with for some time.

Still, the original explosiveness of the missile buildup issue in Western Europe diminished for the Social Democrats as the two superpowers began bargaining it out in Geneva.

Here, the Chancellor is bound to have some respite until 1983 when it comes to the crunch and when the new missiles will have to be deployed unless the Geneva conference proves fruitful, which is unlikely.

The coalition is in bitter need of some successes. Any party alliance must become brittle when joint action can only be achieved with a mutual gnashing of teeth and when exercising of power leads to frustration rather than decisions that will have an impact on the future.

It is still impossible to tell what new problems will arise in the economic and fiscal sectors.

But following the foreign policy successes – and the Chancellor's impending visit to East Germany is one of them – SPD and FDP can tackle their search for solutions with more equanimity and mutual faith.

Difficulties that have been overcome in a joint effort are always a morale booster and make for cooperation because they strengthen that feeling of unity has been somewhat lacking within the Schmidt/Genscher team.

But all this will be of little use if next year's state elections – especially in Hamburg and Hesse – end in defeat.

Schmidt hopes that the change in the general political climate will have its bearing on these elections, and he might not be all that wrong.

Still, it is idle to think that far ahead at this stage. Be this as it may, the Bundestag debate has made it clear that the government is once more firmly in the saddle.

This is another reason why Helmut Kohl rather cleverly made a point of forgoing the heavy stick of polemics. The chancellorship candidate presented himself as a circumspect politician who does not deny the successes of his opponents and who is cautious in voicing doubts in order not to break fragile political china.

Kohl spoke as a statesman who knows that if he were at the helm he could hardly have acted any differently.

He was also right in not fighting a rearguard action on the Ostpolitik front which parts of his party still view with a wary eye.

It was above all Franz Josef Strauss who brought up the disputes of the 1950s and 1960s and who again presented himself as the politician who has always recognised the signs earlier than others and whose assessment has always been more incisive.

But even his criticism was tinged with respect for the government's performance in a tricky international situation. His attacks on the Chancellor personally only served to underscore the fact that Schmidt was the only one he considered his equal.

What transpired from the debate was that the established parties are now on the offensive against the peace movement.

But the extent to which they will succeed in recapturing a significant segment of that movement depends (among other things) on whether they, like the Chancellor, will manage convincingly to articulate a deep personal commitment to peace or whether they will once more seek refuge in formulas and lip service.

The recent political successes should delude nobody into hoping that the Peace movement will now collapse.

Joachim Worthmann

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 4 December 1981)

The Chancellor sails into better weather

[...]elmut Schmidt has sailed back into [...] fair winds after the difficulties of [...]ing with dissent in his own party [...] a difficult international situation.

[...]s relief was evident when he spoke [...] 1500 workers in Lübeck just as the [...] super powers were at last getting [...]nd the bargaining table in Geneva.

[...]aturally, Schmidt knows better than [...]one else that the beginning of the [...]t-American talks on medium range [...]lear missiles says little about their [...]tual outcome.

[...]ven so, the Chancellor can justifiably [...] that it was he whose earnestness [...] commitment greatly contributed [...]ards bringing about these talks and [...]ing it easier for US President Re[...]n and Leonid Brezhnev (whom he [...] just hosted in Bonn) to negotiate [...] hopefully, agree on an arms reduc[...] in Europe.

[...]nd nobody can deny that his deter[...]ation to boost the Western defence [...]ntial in Europe should the Geneva [...]ference fail was a major element in [...]ing the two parties to talk.

[...]chmidt can be certain of the public's [...]roval on this issue. And he seeks this [...]roval and is visibly delighted to get [...] specially on such occasions as his [...] to Lübeck.

[...]nd there is now no need for him to [...] the big stick of a resignation threat [...] he had to at the SPD party congresses [...] the Ruhr area and in Munich.

[...]ut approval by the public has not [...]sped the opponents within his own [...]rty from nobbling him wherever they [...]

[...]he Chancellor owes his more stable [...]ition to foreign and security policy. [...] economic situation with its growing [...]employment is full of pitfalls.

[...]ven if Schmidt considered his visit [...] Lübeck a welcome opportunity to [...] that there will be no increase in [...]ges (in real terms) next year, the lack [...] applause this earned him – and [...]nce the opposition that made itself [...] – must have demonstrated to him [...] the man-in-the-street is more inte[...]sted in what happens at home than in [...]ternational affairs.

Hans Stollhans

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 1 December 1981)

Schmidt goes to see Honecker

The fact that 11 years have passed since the last official meeting between a Bonn head of government and his East Berlin counterpart says a great deal about the relations between the two German states.

Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker were probably reluctant to prolong this long interval still further when they agreed at short notice to meet at Schloss Hubertusstock in East Germany near Berlin.

The somewhat exaggerated haste with which the meeting was arranged does not mean that Honecker has suddenly gained in Schmidt's esteem.

The Chancellor realised that the brusque cancellation of his visit to the GDR in the summer of 1980 had upset the GDR leadership. So he needed to do something.

But Schmidt probably also told himself that conditions for a meeting could deteriorate. The issues involved and Honecker's scope of action would be the same just before Christmas as they would be next spring.

Since the expectations are cautious anyway, nobody has any great hope that Honecker will send Schmidt back to Bonn heavily laden with gifts.

The Chancellor himself is least likely to be holding such illusions. His talks with Leonid Brezhnev must have confirmed that the GDR remains as closely linked with the Soviet Union as ever.

It would be absurd to think that Honecker could exert the same influence on the Soviet union – let alone on both superpowers – as Schmidt has done.

As a result, this issue is unlikely to be as important to Schmidt in these talks as it was in his meeting with Brezhnev, even if Honecker would like it to be so.

If Schmidt talks as frankly to Honecker as he says he did to Brezhnev, he will tell the East German leader two things.

One: any GDR propaganda saying that East Berlin is able to punish Bonn for allowing deployment of American in the Federal Republic would be frowned upon.

Two: So would any GDR claim that it could offer rewards if deployment were prevented.

The manner in which this third attempt on Schmidt's part to go to the GDR came about and the uncertainty as to the topics to be discussed shows once more how far the two countries are from the normal neighbourly relations they both want.

In any event, there can be no normal relations, in the usual sense of international relations, between the two German states.

But in venturing a guess about what Schmidt and Honecker will talk about it would seem safe to include a discussion on where some normal relations can or cannot be established.

And since this must include a stocktaking of what the GDR is contributing towards the anomaly of relations, some politicians would be well advised not to get up in arms when the opposition raises issues like the wall, the barbed wire, the order to shoot on sight and civil liberties.

A frank exchange of views means voicing what irks the other side, though not necessarily in public.

One could even argue that there is nothing that is normal between the two German states and that this is how things should remain.

Even trade is not normal: the GDR not only profits from the "swing" which subsidises its goods but also from the fact that the EEC has tacitly accepted it as a partner, foregoing tariff barriers.

It would be one of the desirable features of German-German relations if the Federal Republic of Germany were also to profit from this arrangement.

The same applies to most other areas ranging from transport via the electricity grid with Berlin all the way to family reunification and the release of prisoners.

In view of the disparities, it is up to Schmidt to speak up openly. One of the issues here is the increase of the amount of money visitors to East Germany must change.

Honecker does not seem to understand why Bonn is urging that the earlier arrangement be restored, though with diminishing tenacity.

This is a point where the GDR is not directly in breach of an agreement and it therefore does not consider it a topic of negotiation.

But Bonn argues that while there was no breach of the letter of an agreement the spirit of it should also count for something since not everything in Germany can be settled in terms of pure legality.

If Honecker were to understand the rules of the game in a democracy – something that is alien to his way of thinking, yet something he will have to take into account – he might find it easier to give in.

In any event, he must become more aware of the fact that such actions, no matter in which area, must not be allowed to repeat themselves because they must inevitably harm German-German relations.

The responsibility for a modicum of normality rests not only with Bonn but – at least to an equal extent – with the German Democratic Republic.

Klaus Dreher

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 December 1981)

■ HOME AFFAIRS

Probe into youth protest gets tied up in words

An inquiry into why the young in Germany are so fond of protesting has ended with a mixture of old truisms and complicated theories.

It was clear from the beginning of the two-day hearing, held by the Bundestag Inquiry Commission, that little would be achieved.

Experts and representatives of youth organisations were confronted with 384 questions.

Subjects included attitudes to school, religious sects, suicide, and the squatting phenomenon.

Even the issue of when politicians should relent to pressure and when they should stay firm were touched upon.

Various opinions were thrown up during the course of the hearing.

The Commission chairman, Matthias Wissmann, (CDU), maintains that the answer is simply that traditional values have been lost.

A renowned Munich political scientist, Professor Kurt Sontheimer, caused dissension among his fellow-experts when he called for confrontation with protesting youth. The State must not allow a minority to breach its monopoly on the use of force.

Others recommended that the State give in and proclaim an amnesty.

Professor Walter Hollstein said that talks could not solve the problem. Political change was needed.

Michael Herrmann, a Coburg sociologist, put his mountaineering boot on the table, saying that — unlike Khrushchev at the United Nations — he did not want to use it to drum on the desk and so express indignation; what he wanted was to show that hiking together and common experience with the young could build a bridge of mutual understanding.

Everyone largely agreed that the protest movement is not restricted to youth but that youth is simply more active than other generations in protesting.

Youth acts because life is still ahead of it, said lecturer Josef Huber.

The interpretation that the whole thing boils down to a conflict between the generations was rejected by most participants.

"What is involved is not a conflict between the generations but a change in values," Professor Hollstein said.

The term "post-material values" was something the experts quickly made use of.

It transpired that such old values as patriotism are by no means rejected by the young but that they are only seen in a different light and given a different substance.

One expert suggested that the "post-material" aims are based on high material demands. In the golden 1970s, the state created the impression that everything was feasible and parents left no wish unfulfilled.

As a result, their children seldom learned that social and material achievements require their price in the form of performance.

Middle-aged and older people apply to everything the yardstick of war and post-war years, said Hermann Glaser of the Nuremberg Education Authority. In his view, the young generation is much more sensitive to the dangers of the future.

But how do the young themselves feel? They tackle things much more realistically: "Vocational training legislation is much more important to me than this whole hearing," said Werner Lutz, a member of the Young Democrats.

Generally, the representatives of youth organisations said the credibility of politics as practised in this country was undergoing the acid test.

Tilman Schmieder of the Protestant Youth Movement accused the politicians of propagating ideals with words.

Hans Brauser of the Trade Union Youth Organisation said that many young people believed that all the politicians wanted was to "buy the votes of the young" and to "pacify them".

The youth representatives agreed that there was no need for a new analysis of youth protest and that instead, politicians should start acting.

On the positive side, the trade union and religious youth organisations registered an increase in their membership.

Herr Wissmann said it would not be easy to arrive at conclusions.

But that the criticism levelled against the bureaucracy was something tangible that should be followed up: "What we want is to shed light on the true causes of youth protest."

Werner Bollmann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2 December 1981)



"We're trying to find out what young people are protesting about."

(Cartoon: Haitzinger / Nordwest Zeitung)

Misunderstanding over role of the Constitution

What disconcerts me somewhat is that there has been so much talk in Germany lately about this being a state under the rule of law and about the nation's liberal-democratic basic order ... The question is, do some Germans not pay more tribute to the state than to the law and do they not experience this liberal-democratic basic order as a mere variation of the state order per se — an order that ensured the day-to-day peace for their fathers or themselves during the Kaiser era or, indeed, during the time of total state?"

These words were spoken by the political scientist and publicist Alfred Grosser when he was awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in Frankfurt in 1975.

They have now been published in a collection of his essays and have lost nothing of their immediacy.

Whenever politicians, bureaucrats or jurists speak of the *freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung* (or liberal-democratic basic order) it is time to be on one's guard. More likely than not the turn of phrase is meant to usher in some kind of sanction or ban which is to be justified or implemented in the name of this order.

During the extremists debate — and even more so in the court ruling on this issue — the words were used in their abbreviated form as "FdGO" as in done in long-winded administrative regulations. This strips the concept of substance; transforming the Constitution into some sort of traffic regulations with right of way for the authorities.

There was a wave of protest nationwide recently when a Heidelberg lawyer in a controversial court case was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for having made false statements and for resisting state authority.

The Federal Constitutional Court threw out the lawyer's plea, again leading to nationwide protest.

Six staff members of a specialised bookstore in Heidelberg joined the protest, whereupon the judge who had sentenced the lawyer and a number of well-known professors of Heidelberg University cancelled their subscriptions with the bookstore for legal literature.

Under pressure from this boycott the owner of the bookstore fired the protesting staff.

One of those who had cancelled his subscription, a professor of international law, said he did so because the bookstore staff had flaunted the Constitution by demanding that the court rulings against the lawyer be lifted.

This is a telling example of German thinking in categories of a state under the rule of law, in this case by an authority on the Constitution: The Constitution is no guarantor of the freedom to hold uncomfortable views but a procedural order for courts under which the Constitutional Court has the last word.

Once it has ruled on a case any opinion contradicting this ruling and any call for an amendment becomes an anti-Constitutional action.

The Federal Constitutional Court also ruled in favour of the German state under the rule of law in the case of the Nuremberg mass arrests involving 141 mostly juvenile demonstrators. The ruling had it that mimeographed arrest warrants were no proof of arbitrariness on the part of the judiciary in dealing with demonstrators.

When the Constitutional Court passed this ruling in the early summer it had no way of knowing what other escapades the Nuremberg judiciary would permit itself later.

Now the Constitutional Court justices do know it and are in all likelihood greatly discomfited: none of the five magistrates in Nuremberg who had to decide which of the demonstrators were to be remanded remember whether they were presented with the records of police questioning or if indeed they had had any evidence as to whether the accused had only demonstrated or whether they had used violence against persons or property.

Only if they had used violence could they have been charged with disturbing the peace — a crime that carries a heavy penalty.

Meanwhile, the entire Nuremberg case has burst like a bubble. The court was embarrassed to continue proceedings in the face of the admission by the prosecutors that evidence had been tampered with — something the prosecutors later termed "a mistake" and "an embarrassing blooper".

Bavaria's justice minister, who kept on defending everything that was happening in Nuremberg to the point where defence was totally untenable, has now been forced to appoint other prosecutors to deal with the case. "Forced" is the operative word here.

He would never have admitted to judicial error (which now, thank heavens, no longer has to result in a miscarriage of justice) if he had not been forced to do so by the protests of citizens who until then had asked for tough action against demonstrators but changed their minds when they found that it was their own children who were put inside for no good reason.

They also found that if it had not been for the dedicated work of defence lawyers the prosecutors would simply have made evidence in favour of the accused disappear.

So what is there to be learned from all this? There are still people in this country who hold high political and academic positions who are unable to meaningfully relate such terms as "freedom" and "order". They are authoritarian personalities who dominate those below them.

Granted, they do achieve what they term successes; but they are also found out, unmasked and stripped of their power; and this gives rise to hope. What it does not give us is grounds to shrug off Grosser's apprehensions.

Hans Schueler

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 2 December 1981)

WAGE AGREEMENTS

Unions limber up for the next round

DIE ZEIT

Deutsche Presse-Agentur was first with the news that IG Metall, the metalworkers' union and the largest trade union in the country, was aiming at wage increases of seven-and-a-half per cent next year.

The union's national executive was still in session when the story broke in the late afternoon of 30 November. Committeemen looked crestfallen; their recommendation was supposed to be confidential.

Someone was going to be in trouble for having leaked the news. At its last conference the union had ruled that the executive's recommendation for the forthcoming round of wage talks was to remain a secret.

The executive was not to jump the gun from the viewpoint of regional wage negotiation bodies but merely to make an internal recommendation.

But the cat was now out of bag, much to the chagrin of regional officials. All they could now do was try and pencil in the small print.

They have every intention of negotiating a variety of terms.

One region tends to favour a minimum monthly wage increase of DM120 and seven per cent across the board. Others would prefer a uniform fixed amount, plus three or four per cent.

Regional wage negotiation boards will rule on local details of what they are going to demand from employers in the weeks and months ahead.

But the element of surprise has gone by the board, and the employers lost no time in returning the compliment.

Hardly had the agency report gone out over the wires but Gesamtmetall, the employers' association, issued a statement that this union policy of offsetting inflation was a risk factor for price developments.


Yet off the record many an employer was prepared to acknowledge that seven-and-a-half per cent was a demand that showed signs of common sense.

It was clear, the argument ran, that the union had begun to learn its lesson from the past.

The recommendation by IG Metall's executive committee is remarkable inasmuch as it is half a per cent lower than last year's figure.

A year ago inflation was expected to average four-and-a-half per cent this year; six-and-a-half per cent now seems a more realistic assumption.

The two sides finally came to terms on an average wage increase of five per cent, in other words a clear wage cut in real terms.



This year the pundits expect inflation to average five-and-a-half per cent in 1982, and they could well be proved wrong again.

Yet the union has advised negotiators to enter into wage talks with a lower claim than 12 months ago.

Rank and file opinion in a number of large iron and steel companies has taken a dim view of the recommendation and called for wage demands in double figures.

The executive has stood by its old formula of demanding the estimated rate of inflation (five-and-a-half per cent) plus a productivity bonus (two per cent).

Employers may be prepared off the record to concede that union demands are reasonable, but that does not mean wage talks are going to be plain sailing.

The line of resistance, they say, will be even harder than last year, and last year's wage talks were agreed by all concerned to have been the toughest and most protected since the war.

In retrospect they seem likely to have been the first of many tough rounds of wage talks this decade. Next year's could well prove even thougher.

Employers may grudgingly admit that the union is being very reasonable this year but they sound a public warning that IG Metall has a dangerous fixation.

The union, they argue, is under the illusion that wages can successfully chase inflation. Whatever else they may have to say, employers are agreed that wage levels will not be maintained in real terms this time round.

Union officials are clearly more cautious than they have been in the past. Senior officials talk in terms of the target of safeguarding real wages.

Targets, one may assume, are to be aimed at but not necessarily to be reached. Off the record officials will even admit that it is a very high target indeed.

But tough wage talks lie ahead, and IG Metall, traditionally first in the fray, is not alone in lowering its visor. So is ÖTV, the public service and transport workers' union led by the burly and redoubtable Heinz Kluncker.

Herr Kluncker and his associates at the ÖTV head office in Stuttgart have been threatening industrial action.

Federal, state, and local government employers have served notice to terminate bonus agreements for public service wage-earners.

ÖTV has replied by terminating the corresponding agreement for salary-earners. Both sides are expecting strikes. "This one is going to be a toe-biter," employers say.

In the New Year Herr Kluncker's vanguard of dustmen, dockers and public transport workers could well be called out on strike in connection with proposed bonus cuts.

Fears have even been voiced that this time public service workers might consider cutting off electricity, gas and water supplies.

Federal government spending cuts have prompted this declaration of war. Bonn has proposed bonus cuts for civil servants, and since they alone would not be enough, wage- and salary-earners are also expected to help economise.

In the civil servants' case the government can simply impose the cuts by decree. Salary-earners cannot have their earnings reduced so readily.

Their wage agreement provides for civil service regulations to be adopted, but Herr Kluncker has no intention of making the government's life that easy.

For wage-earners there is no such provision whatever.

Besides, the union's argument runs, more is that stake than a mere one-per-cent wage cut. It is a matter of principle. The ÖTV executive plans to raise the issue in the forthcoming round of wage talks.

Talks are due to start in March, and what upsets the union is that public service employers plan to cut wages from the beginning of March, followed by a tough round of wage talks.

Given the shortage of cash at all levels of government, the 1982 wage talks promise to be tough.

Cabinet Ministers and their state secretaries in Bonn may have agreed to forgo salary rises, but Herr Kluncker and his men have no intention of following suit.

The union is strictly opposed to public service workers being required to make a special sacrifice of any kind to help bail out the budget.

In the current economic situation economists and employers are agreed that a wage freeze is the only policy that would make sense. But that is easier said than done.

Senior management at Deutsche BP in Hamburg recently said that in view of the company's straitened financial position they were prepared to forgo salary reviews this year.

But the board of directors refused to consider this offer by 370 high-paid executives. Whether they like it or not they are going to have to accept a five-per-cent increase.

The only victims so far of their own appeals for economy and wage restraint have been the members of the government's panel of economic advisers who first mooted the idea of a freeze.

Bonn has ordered a 10-per-cent cut in their salaries next year. *Erika Martens*

(Die Zeit, 4 December 1981)

THE ECONOMY

Experts make a double recommendation

The Council of Economic Experts depicts a bleak picture for 1982. Its latest annual forecast anticipates economic growth (adjusted for inflation) of 0.5 per cent and an average unemployment figure of 1.65 million. There is, however, one ray of light: the balance of payments deficit of about DM30bn this year is expected to dwindle to about DM10bn next year.

The most depressing thing about the latest economic forecast is that the future seems to be getting bleaker.

In the summer, the Bonn Cabinet predicted a growth rate of between 2 and 2.5 per cent in 1982. At the end of October, the major economic research institutes spoke of barely one per cent; and now the Council of Economic Experts has whittled this down to 0.5 per cent.

Even 0.5 per cent is still growth; but this minimal growth means that there will be 700,000 more jobless in 1982 than in 1980, as forecast by the Council.

Bleak prospects indeed, and they become even bleaker in view of the minimal scope of action that remains to the state in controlling this unfavourable development.

The high budget deficit, inflation and the necessity for the Bundesbank to maintain high interest rates, have narrowed the scope of economic policymakers still further.

But it has also become clear that the situation has improved since last summer when the Council sounded the alarm in a special report: the Bundesbank's stability policy has been successful inasmuch as it has restored a certain confidence in the deutschemark. And the Bonn government has charted the course for a reduction of the budgetary deficit.

The Council rightly concludes from this that this has provided both the Bundesbank and the public sector as a whole with a certain scope of action.

But, of course, this cannot mean any sweeping measures. The Council members still pin their hopes on economic stability and competitiveness. And since the experts discern only little dynamism in the economic development, they recommend a dual strategy to promote growth without neglecting monetary stability.


The public sector should soon decide on further measures to help government finances for 1983 and thus bolster confidence in the stability policy.

The trade unions, the experts say, should content themselves in the next few years with maintained the purchasing power of the workers — but even this the experts consider too much for 1982.

In practical terms, this means that the business community (which has lost ground regarding the distribution of incomes in the last few years) will have more money to invest and to create new jobs.

Should such a "stability pact" come to pass it would be justifiable for the state to spend DM7bn for investment promotion — even if this had to be borrowed initially.

It remains doubtful, however, whether such a complicated programme can be implemented politically. Initial reactions show that all parties concerned want to pick their own raisins out of the cake: the trade unions call for a spending programme and the employers for restraint on wages.



Even so, there seems to be some justified hope that at least some of the council's recommendations will be taken seriously next year.

The trade unions are evidently prepared to tread cautiously in their wage demands; the Bundesbank has more scope for interest rate reductions and is likely to make use of it, if only cautiously.

But it is doubtful whether it will be possible to make profit-sharing schemes or other systems that would enable the workers to accumulate some capital palatable enough to induce them to go easy on wages — at least if past experience with such schemes is anything to go by.

It is even more doubtful whether the fiscal policymakers will be able to implement the advice.

The current austerity measures have already strained the coalition to breaking point, and even the Opposition is anything but agreed on the details of such a programme.

What remains, therefore, is the possibility that the latest report by the Council of Economic Advisers will be interpreted as a mere invitation to step on the gas in terms of economic policy and that in doing so the urgent task of thoroughly consolidating public sector budgets will be forgotten.

Thomas Löffelholz

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 21 November 1981)

Monetary policy alone not the answer

In its search for a way out of the economic and fiscal crisis, Bonn is at pains to come up with a concept that would name the sacrifices that will have to be made.

Characteristic here is the fact that Bonn made use of the unique DM10bn profits of the Bundesbank as a means of postponing a thorough clean-up of the budget.

The fact is that Bonn keeps hoping that the 1982 development of the economy will get it out of its fiscal dilemma. But the indications so far are that the worldwide recession will continue.

There are three concepts against growing unemployment under debate in the industrial countries. And once again there is general clamouring for government-financed employment programmes.

This concept of fighting the crisis is based on Keynesian theories but the public sector in this country has barred its way to such an approach by its own indiscriminate spending policy. The Bundesbank, on the other hand, which sees the root of all evil in inflation, would not dream of assisting with the financing.

The extent to which unemployment has structural reasons might be open to discussion. In any event, it is certain that structural and foreign trade aspects are predominant. They include the oil price increases, technological obsolescence and stiffer international competition from an ever-growing number of nationalised companies abroad which are supported by subsidies.

Employment policy à la Keynes, in which private demand is replaced by state demand, must lead to more inflation and so aggravate the crisis after an initial flash-in-the-pan upswing in countries with empty state coffers.

Even so, Bonn continues to talk about such programmes behind closed doors.

The monetarists, the champions of a totally free market economy, on the other hand, believe that all that is needed is to control the money supply.

But so far this recipe alone has been unconvincing. Most industrial countries' central banks have announced limited targets for the growth of the money supply. And in those nations which, like Germany, have made decisive use of central bank instruments in sticking to the target the inflationary tendencies have at least been checked.

The fact that Germany's inflation rate this year has neverthelesss hit the 7 per cent mark is due to the depreciation of the deutschemark which made imports more expensive, the continued rise in energy prices and price expectations resulting from the lack of lucidity in Bonn's economic and fiscal policy.

But monetary policy alone cannot solve the problem. Its success depends on the fiscal and wage policy and on foreign trade constellations such as exchange rates and interest rates abroad.

Lately, the supply-side policy of President Reagan (Reaganomics) has gained in importance. This policy pins its hopes on promoting job-creating private investments, new products and technologies and energy and raw materials savings.

Bonn sympathises with this approach but has not created adequate preconditions that would permit its use in this country.

This envisaged tax relief for 1982 (degressive depreciation) is not enough. The competitiveness of German industry has diminished, many companies are undercapitalised and borrowing is costly.

The sharp decline in profits has not only brought many companies to the brink of bankruptcy but has also led to a disinclination to invest.

Investors find it more profitable to earn high interest on capital markets rather than put their money into business with all the risks this entails.

Supply-side economics calls for better framework conditions regarding taxation, interest rates, wages and red tape — all of which are cost factors.

The three concepts under discussion reflect the economic development since the 1930s. All three have their champions and their detractors and their successes and failures.

No government can afford to adopt only one concept. Instead, it must make use of a range of instruments that will be appropriate in a given situation and will not conflict with each other.

A government which, due to the disunity of the political parties behind it, finds itself pushed in all directions and busy plugging ever new budget holes on top of being intimidated by powerful social groupings lacks the confidence needed for economic growth.

The Bonn government should be as steadfast and clear in presenting its economic concept as the Bundesbank is in pursuing its anti-inflationary policy.

Walter Trautmann

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 24 November 1981)

The five wise men and the crystal ball

Their official title is "Council of Experts for the Assessment of the Overall Economic Development". But they are generally known as the "Five Wise Men".

There are now only four because the trade union-oriented Bielefeld professor of economics, Werner Glastetter, resigned last summer.

The council now consists of its chairman, Professor Olaf Sievert (Saarbrücken University), Professor Horst Albach (Bonn University), Professor Gerhard Fels (Kiel University) and Professor Kurt Schmidt (Mainz University).

Under the 1963 law governing the Council, the professors are appointed by the president of the republic on the recommendation of the government.

Their main function is to analyse how best to achieve the four prime economic goals: price stability, high degree of employment, foreign trade balance and adequate economic growth.

They must present at least one report a year and special reports whenever needed.

The deadline for the annual report is 15 November, but this has never yet been met.

The government must come up with an official comment within the following eight weeks. This is usually done in the government's annual economic report.

The "Five Wise Men" may not recommend specific measures to the government. If one or two of the experts dissent they can cast a "minority vote".

The "Wise Men" are appointed for five-year terms which can be extended. If one resigns, the time he has served is counted as part of the successor's term of office.

The "Wise Men" are not expected to present their extensive report (this year 404 pages plus addendum) free of charge. The chairman draws DM[illegible] a year and the other members DM[illegible].

The Bundestag Budget Committee is said to be trying to cut these salaries by 10 per cent next year as part of the general budget cuts.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 21 November 1981)

BUSINESS

Demands of the 1980s lead banks to change style of management

The major German banks have adopted democratic management structures, according to a study by the American management consultancy firm McKinsey.

Deutsche Bank has for decades had a democratic organisational structure. Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank have also realigned their managements on democratic lines. The idea is to motivate the staff and boost the sagging profits.

The change is most conspicuous at Commerzbank, which developed from a "monarchy" to an almost "federal" structure similar to that of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Unlike his predecessor at the helm, Paul Lichtenberg, Walter Seipp, the new man, is designated as chairman of the board. His authority is relatively limited and resembles that of Germany's Chancellor.

Lichtenberg, who only called himself "chairman of the board", governed his bank — Germany's third largest bank — like an emperor. He was nicknamed "Pope Paul".

His branch managers had more or less the function of courtiers. Loans exceeding DM500,000 had to be approved by the Frankfurt head office; and the terms of a loan were not negotiated on the spot but were laid down by Lichtenberg and his inner circle.

This meant that the large sums the bank invested in training its executive staff were wasted to some extent because the staff was unable to make full use of the competence thus acquired.

Walter Seipp, who had previously worked for a public sector institution, made the branch managers top executives in their own right so that their positions resembled those of mayors or district councillors.

They now have a wider scope of decision in granting credit and are free to decide on loans of between DM2m and DM[illegible]m. They are also free to negotiate the terms of a credit within a given framework.

Seipp feels that there is a new spirit among the staff. But this has not changed the fact that Commerzbank stockholders received no dividends this year for the second time running.

The trouble is that it is customary to judge the quality of a bank by its profits.

Naturally, Dresdner Bank's executives are also well aware of this. Its board chairman, Hans Friderichs, remembered the style of leadership he had evolved as Bonn minister of economic affairs (FDP) and to which he had stuck until the assassination of Dresdner Bank chairman Jürgen Ponto and his appointment as Ponto's successor.

McKinsey's study confirms two things. First, the bank must mobilise the dormant potential in its administration rather than dip into hidden reserves to avoid declining dividend payments. (1980 dividends were cut by one-third).

Second, the organisational structure of a "constitutional monarchy" that Friderichs inherited from Ponto no longer fitted the essentially conservative basic structure of German banks in the 1980s.

The fact that a dyed-in-the-wool liberal like Friderichs should have borrowed his new structure from the Gaullist concept of a presidential democracy is less surprising than it might seem at first glance,

For one thing, the attractive organisational model of the American presidential democracy had already been adopted by Deutsche Bank (which in fact even goes so far as to have two "presidents", Wilfried Guth and F. Wilhelm Christians) and, for another, the presidential leadership model is the most attractive choice to a man in whom the power instinct of a former politician is still virulent.

Thus Friderichs now wants to govern the Dresdner Bank in the way de Gaulle governed France. But it will take a considerable effort before his central power as a banker comes even near the sweeping powers reserved for the president of the French Republic.

Deutsche Bank's 14 control centres at home and its many foreign branches and agencies are headed by independent "senators" or "governors". The Commerzbank's 40 control centres are handled by "mayors" or "district councillors".

Friderichs, on the other hand, wants to see his 14 control centres in the hands of "prefects" — not only at home but world-wide,

They, too, are to be invested with greater powers in granting loans. The idea behind it is to motivate them into performing more efficiently. But it must be noted here that prefects have always been subject to instructions from above.

The Dresdner Bank prefects know that there are four departments at the Frankfurt head office that watch over their actions and ensure that they do not overstep their authority.

Up to now, the managers of one of the larger Dresdner Bank branches could approve loans up to DM5m provided his deputy was prepared to co-sign.

The four new departments at Dresdner Bank's head office are divided up as follows: domestic business, consortium affairs, trade and services and foreign business.

The bank has thus been so streamlined that the board member responsible for gold and foreign exchange trading, Hans-Joachim Schreiber, 49, has become redundant because his department now comes under "trade and services" which is headed by Wolfgang Röller, 52.

Stockmarket insiders noted that Schreiber's resignation was not attributed to health reasons as used to be customary in such cases. They also noted that Schreiber was the third of Ponto's five "crown princes" to leave the Dresdner Bank.

Be this as it may, Dresdner Bank's board is shrinking while Deutsche Bank, like in the Abs era, still operates with a 12-man board.

When Abs left the management of Germany's biggest bank in the 1960s the concern had a business volume of DM18bn. This has now risen to DM180bn — something that would have been impossible without delegating responsibilities and applying the seniority principle.

Good reason for a good dividend

A dividend of 20 per cent does not come about without reason. Thus, the manager of an important Deutsche Bank branch has for many years been able to approve loans of up to DM7m on the spot.

Only credits exceeding DM10m must bear the signature of one of the board members.

But this hurdle is easy to take in a bank that has for years attributed great importance to continuity in matters of personnel. Anybody who reaches the rank of "senator" at Deutsche Bank has the type of managerial qualities that would make him a "cabinet member" in other banks.

But all of the big bankers are democrats — even though some remnants of authoritarianism remain here and there.

Burkhart Salchow

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 27 November 1981)

Hard times bite: record number of firms go to the wall

Few things better show up the state of the economy than the number of firms going broke.

In the first nine months this year, 8,322 folded,


The figure by the end of the year is likely to top 11,000, a record at 25 per cent more than last year.

Behind these figures are the collapses of more than 10,000 independent livelihoods and with them the ruin of families that made great sacrifices in their bid to keep their businesses above water. They also signify the destruction (in most instances for good) of some 300,000 jobs.

Broke firms should usually not be viewed as disasters in a free economy. Firms that are badly managed or financed and that are unable to provide their customers with competitive goods or pay their staff adequate wages must make room for those that make a more sensible use of labour and capital. Even so, the present tide of failures is alarming because:

First, among the firms that go bust are many that could have continued if it were not for excessive tax, interest rates, the social security system, and exaggerated wage demands.

Second, there are too few firms to take their place and come up with better products and jobs. The number of independent businessmen (and hence employers) has diminished dramatically since 1960: from 3.3 to 2.4 million.



This is evidently because people are less ready to take risks and be independent.

Today, the most adequate incomes, maximum social security and — above all — lots and lots of leisure time are most likely to be found in occupations with the least possible risk, be it in government service or mammoth corporations.

To make matters worse, young entrepreneurs have never been faced with as many obstacles as today.

A television film entitled "Trials of Strength" demonstrated this most poignantly. The producers had the brilliant idea — and the stamina — to follow a young man who decided to take the plunge from a well-paid white-collar job into business over a period of many months, recording key scenes on his thorny road.

They are also key scenes for a market economy that is becoming petrified and is about to choke on red tape — a market economy that has ideologically shunted the entrepreneur on to a side track.

There is a young man who founds a firm, creates jobs and offers products that find a ready market. But:

- He has enormous difficulties in finding the capital.
- He has equal problems finding suitable staff and therefore finds it difficult to believe that there is rampant unemployment.
- Due to an ill-thought-out law on continued wage payments in case of sickness he has to week after week pay staff that does not show up for work.
- An unending stream of government officials makes expensive new demands under our perfectionist laws abyss.

He hesitates to tell acquaintances that he has become a businessman. The dirty looks and stupid remarks to the effect that he has now become just another "exploiter" are more than he can bear.

Yet ever since he founded his firm he could barely spare a minute for his hobbies and his privately available income is much lower than it was when he was employed.

He has lived for months with the constant risk of unpayable debt and resultant bankruptcy.

What sort of society is it that discriminates against such people? What is to become of an industrial country in which badly run companies are subsidised only because they are large and in which young entrepreneurs are constantly hobbled by bureaucrats, trade unionists and their indoctrinated fellow-citizens?

Where are new jobs to come from if those who are to create them meet with so little understanding?

Michael Jungblut

(Die Zeit, 20 November 1981)

■ PERSPECTIVES

A matter of pigeonholes, niches, peace and the nature of the nation

People in politics tend to be pigeonholed. So do organisations. It is as though there were some law of nature requiring them to be given a name tag.

What seems to matter most, both to politicians and to the media, is that they can conveniently be assigned some niche or other.

Both are quite content to run the risk of oversimplifying matters. Pigeonholing, be it ever so arbitrary, makes it easier to frame arguments.

That is why the peace movement, having assumed European dimensions and begun to spread to the United States, has been at the receiving end of descriptions that oversimplify.

It has been termed neutral, nationalist, hostile to the United States, naive in its assessment of the Eastern Bloc, skilfully manipulated and way out of touch with reality.

This combination in no way testifies to analytical talent on the part of those who have given it these facile definitions.

There is no way in which everyone who views the arms race with dismay can be fitted into a single pigeonhole. Motives vary. So do origins.

The only concepts that are in any way appropriate are neutralism and nationalism. Many who demonstrate against the arms race are thinking in terms not only of SS-20s and Pershing 2s but also of new national and foreign policy concepts.

These new policy concepts will soon need to be discussed in detail, and they are likely to embarrass a number of politicians on both Government and Opposition benches.

Men like Erhard Eppler who reach for the helm of the peace movement and try to direct it along specific channels are also likely to find themselves on the spot.

There can be not the slightest doubt that the German Question, set aside first by Adenauer's policy of integration with the West, then by Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, must inevitably come to the forc.

The undogmatic Left, as it calls itself, and young people who take a dim view of the political establishment are already wondering whether the national question might not have been neglected.

Widespread discussion of the subject by the extra-parliamentary opposition might, they suspect, provide them with a stable groundwork and a further effective motivation.

Neutrality, raised as an issue at the same time, albeit in a somewhat nebulous manner as yet, is a resurrection of a topic that dominated the political stage in the late 40s and early 50s.

At that time even Social Democrats wondered whether neutrality might not be the only responsible policy for both parts of Germany.

First, it was argued, Germans ought not to be armed to the teeth against each other, and that on German soil.

Second, an attempt ought to be made to overcome the difference between Western democracy and Eastern socialism, both ideologically and in terms of power politics, at least in the heart of Central Europe.

Once the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the Common Market, was set up and the Federal Republic of Germany had joined the Western European Union and Nato, any such ideas retained no more than an academic character.

The only political party to oppose the trend was the All-German People's Party, run by Gustav Heinemann, who later served as a Social Democratic Cabinet Minister and head of state.

It did so at a time when the Social Democrats were ready to make their first concessions on defence policy and backed a constitutional amendment that enabled a separate West German army to be established.

Dr Heinemann called for both parts of Germany to abstain from the arms race, which was then still in its early days, but few voters agreed with this view.

As a result his party made little or no electoral headway and never looked like being represented in the Bonn Bundestag. For the time being, both by electoral preferences and in view of the [...] Democrats' decision to endorse [...]nauer's pro-Nato line, neutrality, if [...] wa the right word for what Heine[mann] had in mind, was a write-off.

From then on all parties in the [Bun]destag advocated reunification in [free]dom, by which they meant free elec[tions] in both German states, which w[as a] utopian prospect (as, from then o[n,] all talk of nationalism in Germany[...]

Endless talk of reunification ce[...] had little or nothing to do with po[...] It was unrealistic and prompted [...] enthusiasm among the general publ[ic].

West Germans had long opted fo[r af]fluence, while people in the GDR [re]signed, feeling (not without some [justi]fication) they had been written off [as a] dead loss.

If the peace movement today [goes] beyond mere protest and comes up [with] ideas, as it is likely to do, political [par]ties are going to have to take an[other] look at the German Question.

The Social Democrats are already [pre]pared to do so. This is the only w[ay in] which, some of them feel, integr[ation] could be pulled off and they could [make] common cause with determined o[ppo]nents of the arms race.

Once they have gone to the trouble [of] a reappraisal, they further argue, [they] might well be able to set new trend[s in] German and world affairs.

Pundits are at a loss to say whether [or] not the Free Democrats have reac[hed] this stage. The Christian Democrats [are] certainly aware of the possibilities.

But the Christian Democrats, [the] party of Konrad Adenauer, have faile[d to] progress any further than the views [they] espoused in the 50s and 60s.

For the Social and Free Democ[rats ...]

Continued on page 9

Fascination of a reunited neutral Germany

The idea of both German states being allowed to leave their respective power blocs and of both Soviet and American forces being withdrawn from German soil holds an undeniable fascination.

There would be no more potential for military aggression based between the Rhine and the Oder. Disarmament in Central Europe, virtually total, would be guaranteed by all.

Germany would be an abode of peace-loving people and an example to its nieghbours. It would also held to keep the peace inasmuch as it could no longer be used for purposes of exploitation or troop build-up in Central Europe.

Inevitably its neighbours in both East and West would have to follow suit. From the arms expenditure saved, half the world could be fed and any amount of environmental protection and nature conservation carried out.

No-one would have anything to fear from this new Germany, which would work only for the good of mankind, and anyone who sought to attack, defeat and occupy it would be doomed to failure.

The social defences erected by Germans thus newly motivated would rule out alien military domination of any kind.

What a compelling idea and stimulus to the imagination of a new generation! What a bold venture! And it is no longer an idea that can be dismissed with a few ironic comments.

The call for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from both parts of Germany as made to Mr Brezhnev in Bonn was backed by a host of well-known names.

They ranged from Heinrich Albertz to Gerhard Zwerenz via Carl Amery, Gerd Bastian, Joseph Beuys and Wolf Biermann to Margaretha von Trotta, Günter Wallraff, Martin Walser and Peter Paul Zahl.

They included artists and writers, politicians and military men, a wide range of the intelligentsia.

And their appeal to the Soviet leader contained the monumental comment: "How we Germans then set about solving our national question is something that must be left to us."

No-one will deny the many people who sign such an appeal or view it with sympathy the moral legitimation with which they do so.

Many will wonder whether the time has not come to take a fresh look at history, disregarding data that have arisen in the wartime and post-war eras.

No-one can dismiss as laughable the discovery by a large number of people on the new left, the environmentalist wing of the political spectrum, that there are certain deficits in the Germans' political soul-life.

Left-wingers are keen once more to talk in terms of home and what is natural, of folk and fatherland. Parts of the peace movement, which still cannot be pigeonholed in its entirety, no longer refer only to disarmament, missiles and nuclear devices; they have embarked on the quest for a new state, a new Europe.

There is no justification for being scornful. Whatever would become of politics if no such developments or stimuli ever arose? It would turn into a pillar of salt.

Yet the risks entailed must not be overlooked. Has the illusion of a better Germany returned to cast its seductive spell after so many years in limbo?

Has the romantic longing for a brave new world in which everything is bright and beautiful staged a comeback?

This facile motivation can hardly be attributed to Stephan Hermlin and Robert Havemann in East Berlin, to Walter Jens in Tübingen or to Kurt Scharf in West Berlin.

Yet they and thousands of others have called on Mr Brezhnev of all people to do something entirely irrational and dispense with the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.

That at least is how the appeal is sure to have been read in Moscow, where all sympathy with the German peace movement will have promptly evaporated.

There can also be no gainsaying that the intonation and pathos of the open letter to Mr Brezhnev include elements of a reformed and peaceloving yet German sense of mission of old.

Who, if not we Germans, are called on by history to alleviate Soviet anxiety and to explain to America the complexities of the Old World (of which the United States has so little idea)!

It sounds very much like the old call for Germany to awaken, albeit a peace-loving Germany, and on this point an embittered dispute has arisen among German left-wingers.

The peace movement has been d[is]missed by W. Pohrt, a student of [the] late Frankfurt sociologist Theodor Ad[or]no, as a revivalist movement of Ger[man] nationalism.

This has led to an outcry, to outr[age,] but not to a clarification of the sit[ua]tion. Jürgen Habermas sounded a wa[rn]ing note against left-wing fascism [as] long ago as in 1967.

This phenomenon, he said, attribu[ted] political value to the movement itself [in] keeping with the old fascist dictum t[hat the] movement was what mattered.

This all leads to less than nothing[. It] just exposes Germany to danger. T[he] Kremlin, worried enough as it is, is [like]ly to be beset by the greatest anxiety [of] all, that something might happen [in] Germany, in the GDR, that led to [the] collapse of its entire empire.

The French view has been cle[arly] stated by a Cabinet Minister in Pa[ris.] France is opposed to German reunifi[ca]tion, to a bid by Germany to break [Eu]ropean ranks.

So are the Dutch, the Belgians, [the] Danes. Only the Americans are no[t af]fected much one way or the other.

Contrary to the view widely held [in] Germany, the direction German d[...] take is not unduly important for [the] survival of America. The United S[tates] can get by without the rest of the [...] if need be, and certainly without Eu[rope.]

Even Germans who have no cl[aim to] political enlightenment must surely [real]ise that if ever any such thing [as a] United States of Germany were to [come] about, its place would be in Europe [and] not in a romantic world midway [be]tween East and West. *Hans H[...]*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 Novem[ber 1981])

THE PRESS

The club that keeps its ear to the ground

DAS PARLAMENT

[Th]e government spokesman has told [t]he National Press Conference [...]

[Man]y German is familiar with these [...]ctory lines.

[Bu]t most people believe the confer[ence] is an official government institu[tion,] a sort of news exchange for jour[nalists.]

[It] is not. It is a private club. Its [mem]bers are the 420 or so Bonn corre[spon]dents of the German media.

[In a]ddition there is the Foreign Press [Club,] which has 315 members, including [journa]lists from the GDR.

[Secti]on 2 of the statutes of the Na[tional] Press Conference reads: "The [purpo]se of the club is to organise press [confer]ences and enable members to ob[tain th]e information they need to keep [the pu]blic informed."

[The] National Press Conference invites [repres]entatives of the government, the [politic]al parties, the Bundestag or im[portan]t interest groups to attend regular [or occ]asional conferences.

[Th]e conferences are not hosted by [gove]rnment but by journalists who [are] the organisers.

[Th]e routine conference takes place [thr]ee times a week, on Mondays, Wed[nesda]ys and Fridays. This is when the [gover]nment spokesman and his deputy [giv]e basic information on the activi[ties, v]iews and projects of the Bonn go[vernm]ent.

[Aft]erwards, the assembled journalists [are gi]ven an opportunity to bombard the [gover]nment spokesman with questions.

[Th]e questions can span the full [range] of government activities. As a re[sult,] the government spokesmen are [often] assisted by spokesmen from dif[ferent] government departments who an[swer] the questions that concern their [de]partments' work.

[Whe]n it comes to highly complicated [issue]s specialists from Ministries con[cerned] provide detailed information.

[Ther]e are also almost daily special [m]eetings.

[Leader]s of all parties in the Bundestag [and o]ther experts are invited to elabo[rate.]

[Fo]r instance: in the discussion on [nucle]ar energy, the Conference asked a [repres]entative of Kraftwerk Union, a [maker] of nuclear power stations, to pro[vide] technical information.

[Onc]e or twice a year, the Chancellor [hims]elf faces the press.

[Whe]n foreign politicians visit Bonn, [it is p]rimarily the Foreign Press Club [that i]s particularly interested in attend[ing, bu]t its members are welcome at any [t]ime as well and may attend with[out an]y formalities.

[Sugg]estions as to who is to be invited [to spe]ak on which subject are put for[ward] by the Executive Board or the [memb]ers themselves.

[Freq]uently it is the parties or other [organisat]ions that ask to be invited; and [the re]quest is granted whenever the sub[ject se]ems to warrant it.

[Erns]t Ney, who was chairman of the [Nation]al Press Conference during most [of th]e 1970s, deplores the fact that the leaders of the political parties have lately taken to holding press conferences at their party headquarters.

Wolter von Thiesenhausen, the Press spokesman of the CDU: "Whenever we have a subject that the Press might consider a scoop, we find it easier to deal with it in our own headquarters because we can then pick a room big enough for the anticipated crush.

"In such cases, we invite all members of the National Press Conference and the Foreign Press Club. But there are of course journalists who belong to neither of the two clubs. They receive individual invitations.

"Whenever the subject concerns only a few specialised journalists or publications they would feel lost in the big hall of the National Press Conference which should in any event not be bothered with minor matters."

SPD Executive Board spokesman Wolfgang Clement: "Our party chairman enjoys facing the National Press Conference. We consider it better to go to the Conference when there is something we have to say rather than hold a conference at our headquarters. Whenever we do show restraint about going to the Conference it is out of respect for it.

"I know nothing that would speak in favour of holding a conference here rather than at the National Press Conference. As soon as we have something to say that is of general interest, we always go to the club."

FDP spokesman Herbert Schmülling puts it this way: "We have up to now not held conferences on our own premises for lack of space. Our own facilities are suitable for conferences with five to ten journalists at best.

"We are in no way disinclined to face the National Press Conference. Generally, the parties hold the smaller conferences on their premises. So far as we are concerned, we are not afraid to rub shoulders with the National Press Conference."

The National Press Conference makes a point of presenting the people who face it with journalists who comply with Section 2 of the statutes which reads; "A Bonn correspondent is somebody who is a full-time accredited editor or freelance journalist working for dailies, weeklies, news agencies, radio or television. His activity must consist in continuous reporting on national politics."

Ernst Ney, Bonn correspondent of *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, interprets this requirement thus: "Continuous reporting does not mean that the correspondent must have a daily piece in his newspaper or that he must be heard daily on radio or seen on the TV screen. What it does mean is that be must be a full-time observer of political events in the Bundestag, the government or the parties. This stipulation is not met by people who publish some sort of a newsletter on behalf of an interest group and who provide a weekly or monthly editorial."

The National Press Conference could easily convey the impression of an elitist journalists' club that lays claim to an information monopoly. Nothing could be further from the truth because there are quite a number of competing organisations.

In the early days of the National Press Conference, the late Chancellor Adenauer introduced what became known as the "Rhöndorf Tea" in 1949/50 to which he invited hand-picked journalists for tea in his home.

There are now more than 30 press circles that invite politicians and are guided by a wide range of criteria.

And then, of course, there are the party headquarters that provide journalists with selective background information in detail. These journalists need not necessarily be sympathisers. In fact, they frequently belong to the other political camp.

Ney says about the function of the National Press Conference: "The fact is that today's press conference no longer has the information value it had 15 or 20 years ago. Television has led to a shift in priorities. The information policy of broadcasting has reduced the value of information provided in open press conferences."

As a result, journalists working for the major media only occasionally attend press conferences. But both the National Press Conference and politicians still attribute a high degree of information value for the public at large to the Conference.

They still regard it as the most effective means of conveying information and as the most useful instrument in preserving a tolerable atmosphere between the fronts. The rules of the game are governed neither by chumminess nor by rowdyism.

Taking the different interests of the two sides into account, this seems to be a sound basis that has proved its worth in more than 30 years. *Ewald Rose*

(Das Parlament, 21 November 1981)

A matter of pigeonholes

Continued from page 8

who formulated and pursued Bonn's Ostpolitik, the rediscovery of German nationhood is more problematic than for the Christian Democrats.

Despite committing themselves to the policy of detente the Christian Democrats have never denied their feeling that reconciliation bids with the East were set about in the wrong way and undertaken in an amateur manner.

The Social and Free Democrats, in contrast, risk jeopardising every treaty they have concluded since taking over power in Bonn.

Reconciling the existence of a single German nation and of two German states is no easy task unless intra-German affairs are viewed in the way Egon Bahr, a leading Social Democrat and man behind the Ostpolitik, sees them.

Intra-German ties, he feels, are a means of forging links between the two states and the only way in which reunification in some form or other can ever be expected to come about.

But this argument is grist to the mill of hard-liners in East Berlin and Moscow who are anything but happy about regulated coexistence of the two German states.

Yet surely these initial and admittedly limited accomplishments need safeguarding at all cost if there is to be any point in insisting on East-West negotiations and on arms limitation.

Helmut Bauer

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 30 November 1981)

Anniversary wrecked by boycott

A ceremony to mark the 25th anniversary of the German Press Council was cancelled after a journalists' boycott threatened to wreck it.

Invitations to 900 guests were withdrawn and the council was left quietly to ponder its future.

The council comprises 10 journalists and 10 publishers and is intended as a self-regulator of the Press. It has had a stormy history.

This latest episode involves the censure of a Cologne newspaper, *Express*, which is owned by the president of the Publishers' Association, Neven DuMont.

Express was unanimously censured by the council, but refused to publish the decision on technical grounds.

Eventually, the paper relented and did publish — so the anniversary would not be spoilt.

But the decision came too late and the occasion was called off.

The council is thus once more faced with an acid test, one of many it has had to face in its brief history.

The worst was last year when a complaint as big as a book on the tabloid *Bild Zeitung* landed on the desks of the council. The affair lead to a near split.

The complaint was based on the books of Günter Wallraff in which he tracked down and exposed the research methods of *Bild Zeitung* and some of its false reports.

The affair came to a head in Berlin when the journalists, opposing the publishers, wanted not only to censure *Bild Zeitung* but for the first time in the council's history, insisted on a fundamental statement on the tabloid's method of operation.

Despite the differences the members agreed to meet again.

But the peace was just an interlude. It lasted until the magazine *Stern* published a report in an attempt to prove that Catholic priests had told people in the confessional to vote CDU or CSU.

The manner in which the story was researched aroused the objection not only of the publishers on the council but also of some journalists.

But the council never managed to arrive at the two-thirds majority necessary for a censure. This chapter ended with the resignation of the Hesse publisher Wilhelmi.

Eventually, the council felt it had weathered this crisis. But this only lasted until DuMont refused to publish a censure on the grounds that there were two representatives of broadcasting stations among the journalists on the council and that the ruling was in violation of Federal Court principles regarding clubs and associations.

In order to save the anniversary celebrations, *Express* decided to print the censure after all.

But the move came too late and the invitations to 900 guests who were to have attended the ceremony were cancelled.

The Press Council decided instead to quietly meditate on its future in view of its badly tarnished image.

President Karl Carstens said in a message of congratulations to the council: "The German Press Council has, in an exemplary manner, done justice to the particular responsibility of a free Press. May it continue to successfully exercise this self-imposed task." *Karl Adam[...]*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 26 November 1981)

■ DEFENCE

Tornado marks end of conventional aviation

Hikers in the Scottish Highlands or the Welsh hills can abandon hopes of peace and quiet while the Tornado, Nato's new swing-wing jet bomber, is being put through its paces.

With wings swung back it zooms through the valley and vanishes over the next hillcrest leaving a trail of ear-splitting noise.

Enemy anti-aircraft defences, even the best and most up-to-date electronic equipment, would have trouble homing in on this hedge-hopper before it disappeared over the horizon.

Flying beneath the soft underbelly of an enemy's radar shield, the Tornado is said to be virtually unassailable.

Experts reckon it will last the air forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and Italy well into the 21st century, although views differ as to whether it can really be called an aircraft.

The Tornado is an airborne process computer full of computers, electronic charts and stabilised platforms, and fully air conditioned.

Every new plane represents a step forward, but arguably none such a leap as Nato's new MRCA multi-role combat aircraft.

The Tornado marks the end of conventional aviation, they say. Yet oddly enough, conventional military aviation is undergoing a renaissance in the nuclear age.

The firepower needed to knock out key military targets in many cases can only be achieved by nuclear weapons, but no-one wants to escatate a conflict to the unpredictable nuclear level.

Nuclear weapons are particularly effective because their destructive potential is so great that they can be guaranteed to knock out a target even without scoring a direct hit.

They compensate for any error in targeting. But in military terms it is immaterial whether a target is knocked out by conventional or nuclear means. All that matters is for it to have been put out of action.

It can just as satisfactorily be destroyed by conventional means provided the delivery vehicle scores a direct hit; and this is where the Tornado comes in.

Spot-on targeting is its strong point. It is the only aircraft in the world that is programmed from take-off to hit a precise target, measured in minutes and seconds along its computer trajectory.

The Tornado's electronic brain memorises its exact destination and heads unerringly towards its prearranged target even when it takes to the air again with a fresh crew at the controls.

Its navigation and attack systems are so precise that it is barely satisfied with conventional points of reference on the Earth's surface.

The Tornado prefers to take its bearings from satellites that orbit the planet. It could well be called a manoeuvrable manned cousin of the satellite generation.

It hops over hedges and tree tops, hugging the ground even when there are hills close by on either side.

This exact targeting, regardless of the weather, is what enables it to knock out targets spot-on using conventional weapons.

It has four separate and independent navigation systems integrated by a central computer but capable of being operated individually.

The pilot can check his flight path by air-to-ground radar, which shows on a monitor screen the ground outlines and the minimum clearance required for safety's sake.

Radar symbols, navigation data and flight readings are flashed on to the cockpit window in front of the pilot, who no longer needs to look down to check his instruments.

One of the symbols in this head-up display warns him when to climb to avoid an obstacle ahead, which could happen if the aircraft is being flown manually.

Air-to-ground radar can also be switched over to automatic controls. The pilot will then have displayed in front of him coloured charts in a choice of three scales.

The chart is flashed into view by the central computer and shows the pilot exactly where the plane is in relation to the ground.

The pilot's second officer, who sits behind him in the cockpit, is the navigation and weapon system specialist, a man who must have the Tornado's complicated auxiliary devices at his fingertips.


He can handle them as though he were playing a piano. Experienced Phantom and Starfighter crews will need four months training to handle the Tornado.

The No. 2 on board Luftwaffe Phantom jets is called the battle observer, although views may differ on whether the term is an accurate reflection of his combat role.

The No. 2 on board the Tornado will be the pilot's alter ego, and vice-versa. Without the No. 2 the Tornado is a flying shell, an aircraft equipped to the hilt but to very little purpose.

He may well have to be renamed. Instead of battle observer he could, for instance, be designated FSO, or flight systems officer.

He will handle a joystick, but not to steer the Tornado. Instead, it will move marks on his radar screen and the computerised chart to check points in the terrain such as church steeples, bridges or railway lines.



With a swing of the wings it's gone . . . the Tornado. (Photo: Sven Si

Points such as these are points of reference for computer navigation or targeting.

To his left and right, at eye-level, the flight systems officer will have monitor screens on to which the computer will flash the aircraft's flight path, continually indicating and readjusting location, deviation from course and course indicated.

Circles on the screen, adjustable in diameter, will indicate intended course above ground.

Another monitor facility, based on the principle of mathematical probability, will show the No. 2 the theoretical possibilities of navigational errors inherent in the system.

Once the systems reaches the zero error point, measured in relation to a fixed point on the flight path, either optronically or by radar, this facility is no longer indicated on the monitor screen.

Flight path, turning points, survey marks, estimate speed above ground and other data are fed to a ground computer at squadron headquarters before the flight.

The navigator can automatically sight the path across an electronic chart. Every point he marks is automatically fed to the computer.

Once ground preparations are completed a tape cassette is inserted into the computer to record the programme. On board the Tornado the cassette is fed to the aircraft's computer system.

So target and flight path have already been programmed, but the system remains flexible. The flight path can be freely changed by hand and recharte flight.

This would be necessary, for ample, if fresh information about emy anti-aircraft defences were to received.

Never has an aircraft been so depe ent on data transmission. Luftw command will assume even more imp tance because the Tornado can ha more information than any aircraft fore it.

But before it is fully operational Luftwaffe will need to check the range of uses to which the Tornado be put, and a start has been made.

In Cottesmore, England, over 40 T nados are available for training f crews. They fly from 8 a.m. to midn and have so far logged 4,000 ho without mishap.

Flying low at top speed, the air automatically adjust course negligibly right itself as it flies. Switched over manual controls, it is said by all have flown it to fly much like a Ph tom or Starfighter.

It will normally fly, in combat, at altitude of about 200ft, cruising at knots, or 625mph, this being the sp at which the computer gives the to fire, subject to the go-ahead from crew. Computer firing is superior to hu reactions and reduces the risk of mis geting.

At hedge-hopping altitudes the T nado can reach speeds of 750 knots, 875mph, which certainly beats comers. At higher altitudes it is cap of Mach 2.2.

The Tornado will enable the Lu waffe to meet Nato's flexible respo requirements in accordance with M 14/3, the document in which the str gy is outlined.

Round the clock and regardless of weather it will be able to knock out enemy targets by conventional means.

This could reverse the roles, for the Warsaw Pact to make first use nuclear weapons, a point that has yet be raised in connection with the aircraft.

This is partly because the Tornado more uninformed critics than it supporters who have gone to trouble of sounding out the potenti its complicated weapons system tech logy.

Correspondingly few people are a of the opportunities it opens up in warfare.

The Tornado is an aircraft and such is likely to crash sooner or All aircraft have crashed at some ti other, even the jumbo jet.

One can but hope there will be public hysteria when a Tornado happen to crash and that people realise what it means.

Unfortunately it is so noisy that portunities of low flying for tra purposes will be strictly limited in many. But every sonic boom it must be a reminder of its deterr fect. *Cay Graf Brockdorff*

(Die Welt, 26 Novembe

Today a Boeing 707, tomorrow an Awacs aircraft

The gate slowly opens to let a coachload of correspondents through to a top-security section of the Dornier works in Oberpfaffenhofen, Munich.

A guard beckons us past countless electronic devices, laboratories and soundproof walls. Getting out or taking photographs is strictly forbidden.

Chained to the ground by cables attached to ground support equipment, two Awacs planes are virtually out of sight. Awacs stands for airborne early warning and control system.

In strict secrecy 18 Boeing 707 320Ds are here being converted to Awacs, with radar shaped like a flying saucer superimposed on their fuselages.

Awacs is a crucial tactical information system for the Nato countries. Its equipment can relay an enormous amount of data to a large number of users in seconds.

It relies on special techniques to prevent jamming and unauthorised snooping. Awacs computer equipment is to be improved by extra German equipment that will boost its capacity.

Dornier have been commissioned by Boeing to coordinate the operational electronics of all 18 Nato E-3A Awacs planes.

The terms include equipping and checking special laboratories and test devices, procuring ground service and test equipment, fitting the aircraft out with operational equipment and testing it and giving the planes a final check before returning them to Nato units.

On 5 February 1982 one of the two Awacs now being refitted in Munich will make its first test flight from Geilenkirchen.

Nato's Awacs fleet will be refitted by Dornier in Munich and test-flown in Geilenkirchen and bases in Norway, Italy, Greece and Turkey by May 1985.

Its 18 planes will join America's 25 Awacs and 11 similar systems flown by Britain's RAF.

The Nato fleet will cost DM11.4bn,

Continued on page 11

THE ENVIRONMENT

Wave research aims to protect coast from pounding of big breakers

Hanover, 150km inland from the North Sea as the crow flies, will have a unique maritime research ity: a full-size wave tunnel.

Waves and breakers can be simulated full size. Sand movement, dikes and al destruction can be probed in re ic conditions.

The tunnel, which will cost DM20m, been funded by the Scientific Re ch Association. It is due to be ned next year.

It should prove particularly useful simulating breakers that cannot be factorily reproduced in scale model, ch is the usual way in which hydro ists and shipbuilders carry out tests.

When breakers break on the seashore, g an enormous amount of energy, surface tension of the water is most portant, and it cannot be successfully ulated in scale model.

Small breakers that hit the shore don't ave the same as much bigger brea

When waves hit the coast they con t the energy of swell into turbulence, n into heat.

h a few metres energy is discharged t was often generated hundreds of usands of kilometres away in the at sphere and transmitted via small es to larger ones.

Waves three metres tall release 60,000 watts of energy over a measured ki metre in breadth, which has prompted the idea of harnessing them to generate electric power.

There have been many impressive eye-witness accounts of the quantity of energy released when breakers hit the shore. One of the most impressive was recorded in Oregon back in 1891.

It must have been an enormous wave to smash the light of Tillamook lighthouse, 48 metres above sea-level!

Breakers on the cliffs along the North Sea and Baltic coast also pack punch; they can certainly make short shrift of dikes and embankments.

The energy released when a wave breaks makes up an extraordinarily complex process, since it heads in all directions.

Some heads back out to sea, some is converted into groundswell, which drifts backwards or sideways, taking sediment with it (as off the North Sea holiday isle of Sylt) and some makes the ground reverberate in the breaker zone.

But much of the energy, and possibly a crucial proportion, as Brunswick coastal research scientist Professor Alfred Führböter noted in the early 70s, is expended in air intake into the seething foam.

This intake is very high in the classic breaker, in which the crest plunges down a wall of water into the trough.

There have been no exact measurements of the air contained in a breaker as it breaks, but a percentage of between 50 and 60 may reasonably be assumed:

This air intake uses up so much energy because each air bubble has to overcome the water's surface tension, and some are pressed deep into the water.

The mixture is created in next to no time over a distance of about half a wave and the energy turnover takes place in a strictly limited area of beach.

Along this narrow stretch of shoreline the breaker's destruction potential is correspondingly high.

As the wave then runs to ground the energy stored in the air bubbles is regained, partly by turbulence, which occurs as the bubbles rise and make it look like the water is boiling.

The wave tunnel is under construction near the Mittellandkanal in Hanover and was designed by Professor Führböter of Brunswick and Joachim Grüne of Hanover University.

It will be a concrete basin 324 metres long, five metres wide and seven metres deep with a 900kw wave machine at one end. In water up to five metres deep waves up to two-and-a-half metres tall can be generated.

This is the sort of wave that breaks in heavy seas along the German coast. The water used to simulate it in Hanover will be drawn from the canal, then filtrated and processed.

It will then be used to simulate in full size heavy swell and breakers, coastal currents and the enormous amounts of sand they shift and the impact of breakers on the beach and the dikes.

The first project for which the Hanover wave tunnel is to be used is a study of the safety of modern, sand-based, asphalt-clad dikes.

They were first built in Holland, then in Germany, from the 50s on, and are felt to be extremely safe, although the case is not proven.

They have yet to be seriously but to the test in practice. These are the tests to be simulated in Hanover.

Would they withstand the heavy pressure blows thrown by breakers if there were as much as the minutest rift in them?

Pressure blows are much more powerful than the breaker itself in its run-up. They occur when water shoots out of a wave as it builds up.

This tongue of water is often spat from the crest of a breaker. Professor Führböter has shown from measurements taken during a flood tide at the Eider dam on the German North Sea coast that roughly every other wave strikes such a blow.

In principle coastal defences are more than a match for pressure blows corresponding to pillars of water up to 110 metres tall.

The blows are limited in time and space and dike embankments should usually withstand this sort of pressure without much difficulty.

But the moment rifts or fissures occur, the pressure rushes at them through the water at the speed of sound, roughly 1,500 metres per second.

After the 1962 floods clay dikes along the German coast were found to have been eroded in craters where dry rifts had broken up the turf covering them.

This, the work of pressure blows, could prove even more devastating when rifts occur in the asphalt or concrete casing of a dike and are passed on to its interior.

These asphalt-clad dikes are usually filled with loose sand, say, and the pressure could well destroy the asphalt or concrete from within.

The sand could be liquidised and erode the dike from within to even more catastrophic effect.

The structure of the dike's filling may be so unfavourable that it collapses like a house of cards and starts to flow and collapse the shore defences.

This could happen where sand and clay are propped up against each other. The collapse could then occur very, very fast.

Harald Steinert

(Der Tagesspiegel, 28 November 1981)

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towards which Bonn is to contribute 30.7 per cent. America's share will be 42, Canada's 9.8, Belgium's 2.7, Denmark's 1.7 and the other Nato countries' 13.1 per cent.

DM1.23bn, or roughly half Germany's share of the bill, will be offset by contracts awarded and expenditure incurred in the Federal Republic of Germany.

As in Munich, German companies will manufacture parts, supply equipment, carry out refitting and provide facilities of various kinds.

The first US-trained Awacs crews are already waiting for the chance to take over at the controls in Geilenkirchen. There are to be eight German and 15 American crews.

RAF Geilenkirchen will cost about DM200m to re-equip for its new role. A thousand service and civilian personnel are converting facilities right now.

Some strange problems will need solving before the Nato Awacs can successfully carry out missions. Careful attention must be paid to crew nationalities, for instance.

Turkish crew members cannot be expected to serve alongside Greeks and vice-versa. Norwegian air force personnel will be reluctant to take orders from German or Italian officers.

The conditions France may stipulate in respect of overflying rights have yet to be clarified, but France is keenly interested in access to the information gleaned.

Nato, however, does not want to supply information in return for the right to use French air space. It would prefer to pay in cash, say $10m or $20m.

There seem to be no difficulties ahead in finding bases for the planes. Even if they pull out of Nato neither Greece nor Turkey seem intent on cancelling their Awacs agreements.

But where at the 18 planes to be registered? America and Canada are not keen to supply insignia. Belgium, Holland and Norway are not keen on the idea of Luftwaffe markings.

Registration in either Greece or Turkey seems to be ruled out by the friction between them. Italy would not like to see the planes registered in Greece either.

Britain is ruled out because it has its own Nimrod reconnaissance planes. That leaves only Luxembourg, which could well end up registering the most expensive and ambitious weapons system Nato has ever commissioned.

Klaus Wittkamp

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 18 November 1981)

■ THE ARTS

The occasional defiance of understanding

The catalogue of the current exhibition at Munich's municipal art gallery in the Lenbachhaus begins by saying that Arakawa's work is among the most fascinating and ambitious but also the most difficult in contemporary art.

What he is getting at, readers are then told, occasionally defies full understanding. That could be a warning to the visitor; it could also be a point in the artist's favour.

In Germany what is hard to understand automatically enjoys a bonus, It is credited with concealing something that is profoundly significant,

Immediately before Arakawa the gallery featured Joseph Beuys, to whose work the above comments might equally be said to apply.

But apart from laying claim to being important in what they have to say, the two men's work has little in common.

Beuys' murmur of obscurity stands in sharp contrast to Arakawa's Cartesian clarity. Emotion stands in contrast to logic, the atavistic in contrast to the progressive.

Arakawa's art, or this, at least, is the impression it conveys, reflects an attitude characterised by a scientific outlook, and that makes it congenial.

He was born in Tokyo in 1936 and has lived in New York since 1961. His painting has been accepted without much dispute. He never achieved a major breakthrough; he was just around.

When he made his first appearance on the international art scene in the mid-60s he benefited from two factors: a growing interest in concept art and in the structuralist approach.

Both play a major role in his encyclopaedic undertaking entitled Mechanism of Meaning, begun in 1963 and still a work in progress.

Texts penned by Madeleine Gins, the artist's wife, exist that accompany and comment on his work.

They combine an objectivised description based on scientific nomenclature and a somewhat hermetically sealed interpretation governed by complex association of ideas.

A corresponding mixture is to be found in Arakawa's painting.

In 1976/77 he painted a picture with the unusual title In And Out of the Blank. Consisting of nine boards, it is more than three metres tall and over 15 metres long. The viewer can walk alongside it and imagine it to be a gigantic rolling picture that unfolds piece by piece before his eyes. He will notice that there is little really to see on a surface area of many square metres. There are forms reminiscent of diagrams from scientific textbooks. There are schematic portrayals of rotating pillars. The energy of their movement is made visible by radial lines. There are others derived from the repertory of shapes used by Duchamps in his Large Glass, simulating an opening of the picture into a greater depth.

Others immediately cancel out this illusion of space. On one board we see the coordinates of a map in which there are no geographical outlines.

On another there are dotted lines that look like the traces left behind by elementary particles in a fog chamber.

Above all, the painting includes lengthy texts that at times cannot be read consecutively, being separated by intermediate boards on which the writing is in mirror image or upside down.

These texts continually include the terms point blank, focal point, distance and texture.

What the skeleton or illusionist shapes have to do with the written communications remains unclear.

It could be that the tittle of the painting, In And Out of the Blank, refers to a key concept in Zen Buddhism, the intuitive realisation that, as Suzuki puts it, all things come from the blank and return to it and this coming and going is but a single movement.

Even if this assumption were right we should still have no clear pointer as to how to use the texts.

Are the words "point blank: distance of the focal point, how anonymous is this distance, which is a texture" to be understood as an instruction to look for the appropriate pointers in the painting? Or does Arakawa mean there is no answer to the question?

Has he clad nonsense in the form of a problem to be taken seriously or is he trying to draw attention to the fact that the process of perception is always associated with some thought processes or other, possibly paradoxical ones?

The lengthy panorama of emptiness is the centre point of the exhibition, with other work on the subject, blank, grouped round it.

Otherwise the show outlines in paintings and drawings the artist's development from 1962 to the present day.

Earlier works remind one that Arakawa has always worked with language in his painting. Initially the crux was whether and how, in an art context, a

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Arakawa's 'In and Out of the Blank'. (Photo: Catalogue)



Ralph Goings' 'White Tower' (1976) being exhibited in Munich. (Photo: Catalogue)

First, dream and depression – now an American shadow

America's shadow has been cast on German art, with the Dream and Depression 1920-40 and Edward Hopper exhibitions at Munich *Haus der Kunst* now being followed by American Art from 1930 to 1980.

It is a collection of 216 works by 127 artists put together by the Whitney Museum, New York, which on 18 November was 50 years old.

Until the Second World War the commanding influence of Europe determined the course of American art. It did not come into its own and gain true freedom and independence until the 40s.

Even then crucial stimuli were provided by emigre artists. There was the abstract painting of Hans Hofmann, who hailed from Wissenburg, Bavaria, and the pop art of Richard Lindner, who emigrated to the United States from Munich in 1933.

Munich can now see for itself an artistic era, but an American one. The pleasure is not entirely unalloyed, sad to say. The organisers hit on the weird idea of arranging the entire complex forcibly in eight topics.

They are abstract nature, America in close-up, harmonic geometry, bimorphic abstraction, individual vision, still life, pictures of mankind and painting of gestures.

This tends to upset the overview because there is continual overlapping. Even the catalogue is no help and not much use as a guide, especially as only trained weightlifters could possibly carry it around.

Yet if one enjoys the exhibition in one's own good time it can prove truly exciting. Ben Shahn, for instance, is one of the painters who most clearly expressed the way it felt like to live at the time of the Depression.

His works testify to a dark, smoky colourfulness that stands in sharp contrast to the romantic bright symbolic world of Georgia O'Keefe.

Other artists such as Edward Hopper, Charles Sheeler, Elsie Driggs and Richard Estes tried to adapt European movements to their work, especially cubism but also *Neue Sachlichkeit.*

Alongside realism and verism elements of the fantastic and the surreal make their appearance in the American art world, as in the double portrait by Helen Lundeberg, the landscapes with figures by George Tocker and in Jim Nutt's erotic puzzle painting entitled What the Hell's Going On?

Under the keyword people we are shown Hopper's lonely figures, Roy Lichtenstein's gaily-coloured charts and Andy Warhol's banal screen prints of Marilyn and Jackie.

They are a far cry from work concentrating exclusively on colour, form and line, such as the blue-and-yellow Tribute to the Square, by Josef Albers, or the large format, rhythmically glowing colour spaces of Barnett Newmann.

The show goes on to the gesture painting of Jasper Johns and the work of Robert Rauschenberg, Jackson Pollock and Sam Francis.

They are like ecstatic strokes of the brush on outsize canvases, optimistic signals from the New World.

This Munich exhibition is a powerful accumulation of works of art in which those without a clearly recognisable object clearly hold priority.

This is not without its attraction, but it does make it hard work ploughing through the American painting undergrowth of the past 50 years.

Rose-Marie Borngässer

(Die Welt, 26 November 1981)

MEDICINE

Probing the causes of senility

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

How and why man ages, what the biochemical mechanisms and logical laws are that underly the ageing process, and if this process can be controlled or retarded are major lines of medical investigation.

It has been established that the brain plays a major part in ageing.

The fact that the human brain shrinks as it ages has been known since the last century. The shrinking begins at the age of about 60.

In all likelihood this also leads to the destruction of nerve cells, though this affects the various parts of the brain in different ways. It is known, however, that the cortex suffers most.

Professor Herbert Haug of the anatomy department of the Lübeck Medical School told the 2nd International Ernst Reuter Symposium in Berlin that it is in particular the front section of the cortex (which conveys sensory perception) that diminishes in volume.

"The most conspicuous part of our findings was that those sections of the brain that convert sensory perception into consciousness don't age at all while the parts that govern the implementation of new ideas begin to deteriorate between the ages of 60 and 65," said Professor Haug.

He stressed that this fact in itself does not permit any clear conclusions but that it indicates that "the ageing brain should be used as much and as actively as possible."

Professor Haug based his story on the microscopic and macroscopic examinations of 70 human brains.

He emphasised that every part of the brain must be examined separately, which is a new approach.

There are parts of the brain, he said, that don't deteriorate at all. Other parts begin to decline at the age of 30.

Professor Wolfgang Schlote of Tübingen University reported on new findings in the field of fat pigment. Here, changes that occur with age have been known for some time but their significance was largely unexplored.

Thus, for instance, it had been assumed that the organic pigment lipofuscin, which collects in the nerve cells and increases in quantity with ageing, is a harmful substance that obstructs the metabolism of nerve cells.

But Professor Schlote and his team have established that lipofuscin can be found in the cells of infants and that it is therefore unconnected with ageing.

It is a physiological part of the cell with the function of absorbing harmful metabolism residues which the nerve cells themselves are unable to break down.

If this mechanism stops functioning properly nerve cells start deteriorating and hamper the functioning of the central nervous system. This must sooner or later lead to severe neurological disorders.

Modern brain research has given much attention to senility.

For the past three years researchers have been convinced that they have evolved a clear concept of the processes underlying senility.

"It appears," neuropathologist William Meier-Ruge of Basle University told the symposium, "that senility is essentially a malfunctionong of the cholinergic system, the system closely connected with memory and located in the inner brain and cortex."

Senility, or senile dementia as experts call it, is therefore no automatic disorder of old age but a genuine degenerative disorder which can be hereditary.

This seems to be borne out by the fact that families in which Mongolism is prevalent and those with a high incidence of lymphatic leukemia are particularly prone to senile dementia.

Various concepts for the treatment of senile dementia (which must not be confused with the loss of memory common in old age) have been developed.

Most of these treatment methods involve the use of pharmaceuticals.

Since patients suffering from senile dementia show disorders of metabolism and hence cerebral energy the effectiveness of the transmitter substance acetylcholine is impaired.

Ways of improving brain's function

This leads to reduced brain performance, especially where perception and its cerebral processing is concerned.

"One pharmacological approach here," Professor Meier-Ruge said, "would be to stimulate the cholinergic processes – perhaps by retarding the production of certain enzymes that interfere with the functions of acetylcholine.

"Another way of improving the brain's functions would be to develop a substance that would stimulate the functions of acetylcholine."

The results of several studies in the fields of experimental and clinical pharmacology indicate the possibility of therapeutically influencing the cholinergic system and so treating the early symptoms of senility.

But it is likely to take several years before an effective drug becomes available to practitioners.

Margot Said-Lang

(Der Tagesspiegel, 21 November 1981)

Looking back in anger – or in satisfaction

Men at what is known as the "midlife crisis" stage look back on their life with more satisfaction than women.

And, research reveals, the older a person, the greater the satisfaction with past life.

According to a study by Würzburg psychologist Dr Joachim Wittkowski, women have much the same view of their existence to date whether they are in their 40s or 50s.

But not men. Those in the middle 40s look back with less satisfaction than those 10 years older.

But the reverse is true when it comes to current lifestyle. Here the younger group is much happier.

According to Wittkowski, this growing satisfaction with the past life that increases with age might have to do with a more realistic assessment of a person's own possibilities and limitations and the adaptation of his demands to existing circumstances.

This interpretation, Dr Wittkowski says, is supported by research results showing that the realisation of having had one's due share of happiness grows with age.

In a study funded by the Scientific Research Association and carried out at Würzburg University, Dr Wittkowski examined how adults deal with past experience.

This fills a research gap because most projects of the recent past have dealt with youth, childhood and old age, neglecting the midlife years.

Yet for the past ten years the term "midlife crisis" has been discussed widely, with everybody being convinced of knowing what it's all about.

Dr Wittkowski's study was based on 104 men and 114 women aged between 43 and 57. Each of the test persons was interviewed for about one-and-a-half hours on subjects like "social integration", "religiousness", "self-esteem", "satisfaction with life", "outlook for the future" and "death".

This was buttressed by socio-biographic information on "experience of loss", "indications of ageing", "experience of physical vulnerability" and "death-related experience".

Although the available data have not yet been fully evaluated, a number of interesting facts have transpired.

It has been established that the experience of loss plays a major role in the retrospective assessment of a person's own life.

The greater the number of such experiences – death of next-of-kin, separation from the spouse, grown-up children leaving home and the loss of objects of material or sentimental value – the greater the dissatisfaction with life and vice versa. These findings apply equally to both sexes.

And the greater the number of physical indications of ageing – deteriorating hearing and vision, fatigue and even the fact that there are grandchildren – the greater the dissatisfaction with life at present and vice versa.

Those who have frequently experienced physical vulnerability illness, surgery or accidents are always more discontented with their life – both past and present – than others.

Being old does not necessarily mean being rich in experience. As a result, Dr Wittkowski differentiates between chronological and psychological age in an effort to find out whether it is actual age or personal experience that makes for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with life.

The results are unambiguous: regardless of age, those who have remained psychologically young – in other words, the test persons with few unpleasant experiences – were invariably more satisfied than those with many such experiences, i.e. the psychologically old. This again applies to both present and past lives.

But not all experiences and not all biographical data have the same effect.

Regarding death, Dr Wittkowski found a negative link between satisfaction with life at present and fear of death in women.

Women who are very satisfied with their present lives are not particularly worried about death while those who are dissatisfied have a pronounced fear of it.

It also transpired that not only fear of death and dying but also an attitude of acceptance towards death is in inverse relation to satisfaction with life. This again applies to both sexes.

People who are particularly contented with their lives usually don't associate death with metaphysical facts and they show a clear acceptance of their own mortality. But this naturally has nothing to do with suicide tendencies.

Renate I. Mreschar

(Kieler Nachrichten, 21 November 1981)

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word, the concept for an object, might replace the portrayal of the object.

Later he drifted further off into linguistic speculation. Linguistic communication was set on a par with pictorial portrayal.

But the one was as esoterically formulated as the other and the result was a somewhat incomprehensible tautology.

Leonardo insisted that art in general and painting in particular was science in a very special sense of the term. In his essay on painting he explained why.

The essentials of painting, body, shadow, light, colour, distance, nearness and so on, could only be grasped by the intellect, the hand being no more than the executive organ.

Leonardo admittedly based his viewpoint on the immediate experience of reality, not on the idea that transformed such experiences into language. Art was a language but did not have a language of its own.

This, he argued, was why the greatest damage occurred when the idea outstripped the work. He had realised that danger arose when a work of art based on an intellectual process possibly shed more light on the circumstances in which it was originated than on the realisations gained and visualised in the painting.

When the way in which someone perceives a thing and the thought processes involved are thematised, the painting itself turns out to be a treatise on how art comes about and not what it is.

This is the trap in which Arakawa is caught. By reflecting on his medium he tries to gain an insight into artistic strategies but fails to end up with art itself, merely with a recipe for it.

Recipes should be included in cookery books and not hung on the wall, no matter how decorative they may be.

There is a tale by Woody Allen that begins like Dashiel Hammett's Maltese Falcon, but with the difference that Sam Spade is not called Sam Spade and the missing person who is supposed to look for the private eye is not a relative but God himself.

This in turn leads to zany investigations, but at some point or other, nearly just in passing, there is a mention of conceptual nothingness.

This sounds most impressive but gives the lie in a lightning manner to an entire jargon of the profound.

Arakawa's meaningful yet incomprehensible sentences could well come into this category. But I fear he means them seriously.

Helmut Schneider

(Die Zeit, 27 November 1981)

■ YOUTH

Pessimists win by a head

DIE WELT

Fifty eight per cent of young Germans have a bleak view of the future, according to a survey by Deutsche Shell AG.

The other 42 per cent are confident.

Pessimism was particularly pronounced among young people with higher educations.

Optimistic and pessimistic outlooks are closely linked with plans for the future, everyday life and approval or rejection of certain group styles such as punks and rockers, music and fashion styles.

It transpires that the optimistic ones are politically less interested but commercially more interested.

According to the study, this group includes soccer and disco fans. They also show a noticeable tendency to xenophobia and a law-and-order mentality.

The pessimists' bleak outlook has not prompted them to twiddle their thumbs and bemoan the poor prospects for the future.

Instead, they are prepared to criticise, become involved and put up opposition. This expresses itself in political protest movements.

The different assessment of the future is closely linked with affiliation with political groupings: the more optimistic the greater the trend towards the conservative parties. And the more pessimistic the greater the leaning towards the environmentalists.

Asked which political grouping they would lean towards (regardless of the vote cast), 24 per cent opted for the SPD, 20 per cent for the environmentalists, 18 per cent for the CDU/CSU and 6 per cent for the FDP. Less than 0.5 per cent are in favour of the extremes on the left or the right.

Most (67 per cent) say that older people could also learn from the young.

Asked specifically what, 36 per cent said "freedom from prejudice; and partnership"; 23 per cent cited "spontaneity" and 21 per cent "more tolerance".

These answers were mostly from the pessimists.

According to the study, 95 per cent do not believe that wars can be eliminated and that there can be a society without worry.

Eighty per cent anticipate raw materials shortages, economic crises and famine; 78 per cent do not believe that there will eventually be more equality among people and 76 per cent expect technology and chemicals to destroy the environment.

The study was by a research team headed by the psychologist Professor Arthur Fischer (Frankfurt) and sociology Professor Werner Fuchs (Marburg).

It is based on a micro-census of the Federal Statistical Office carried out in May and June this year and involving 1,077 young people between 15 and 24.

The results, Fischer and Fuchs say, are representative for the nine million Germans in their age group, 16 per cent of the nation's population.

rtr

(Die Welt, 30 November 1981)

The years of stability and peace take their toll

Today's young are making greater demands on society than the young of other generations, says a study commissioned by the Bonn government.

This is attributed to the fact that there has been stability, affluence and peace for so long.

Main concerns of the young are securing peace and disarmament, changing living styles, getting better housing and improving the lot of the Third World.

They say that society today shrugs off their problems and that parliaments do not discuss what they want for the future.

Results of the study are not dramatic, says Bonn Family Affairs Minister Antje Huber. But useful material was revealed.

The study was commissioned becau[se] of growing tension between large se[c]tions of youth and society.

The survey shows that youth [is] sceptical towards today's politics and th[e] feeling of an impending threat has in[-]creased, says Frau Huber.

The young frequently consider them[-]selves misunderstood and their need[s] inadequately discussed.

Sometimes, lack of understanding [by] institutions leads to actions and form[s] of expression which, in turn, older peo[-]ple are unable to understand.

The young don't want to know abou[t] the "world of yesterday." Their world [is] no longer intact and their future no[t] rosy.

They fight for an environment worth living in and tolerable housing conditions.

Because they say society shrugs off their problems and that parliaments ignore their future, they are not interested in political party work; they do not become involved but stay away from the polling booth. They are looking for new orientation points to hold on to.

The young are suspicious of our mammoth administrative machinery which they do not understand and which they say turns people into numbers.

They would like to see smaller organisations that can be understood and that provide emotional support.

They want the needs of minorities catered for and they demand equal chances for women and girls.

The study is based on scientific surveys and a great many interviews.

Margret Kämpf

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 27 November 1981)

Everything you've always wanted to know about study habits

A 1978 opinion survey by the Allensbach Institute caused a controversy when it showed that university students spent only four hours 26 minutes a day studying.

A new study on the same question arrives at new conclusions. It provides new insights into students' attitudes towards work.

They survey was by the Göttingen University Seminar for Market Research and the research team was headed by Professor Hans Knoblich.

Selected at random, 155 students were asked to record study and leisure time in a diary throughout June 1980.

They survey encompassed 20 workdays and nine weekend days in a month without term exams and excursions.

On the five working days (Monday through Friday) of each week the students put in an average of 32 working hours.

Ninety-six per cent also worked on weekends, averaging 23 hours for the month's Saturdays and Sundays and one public holiday.

When they were given important tasks the work time on weekend days rose to a daily 7 to 8 hours.

But the degree of industriousness varied: 37 per cent worked less than 30 hours a week while more than 30 per cent put in 40 or more hours. There were no differences in that respect between the sexes.

Almost all (98 per cent) worked after 6 p.m., putting in a weekly six hours at that time; 60 per cent worked late on weekends as well.

By and large, all worked regular hours and did not extent their working time prior to special tests or examinations.

Only one impending exam led to more work after 6.00 p.m., averaging out at 11 hours a week.

It transpired that students living alone devoted less time to their studies than those who lived with someone else or had their families in the same city or lived in a shared apartment. This indicates that weekend trips to visit the family detract from studying.

Surprisingly, the students' own estimates of their working hours were much higher than shown by the diaries. Instead of the estimated 8 hours at lectures, the average in the diary was 4 hours and 12 minutes. The real attendance at seminars was 3 hours and 45 minutes instead of the estimated 6 hours.

This seems to indicate that the students plan to do more than they can actually handle when it comes to the crunch.

Eighty-six per cent chose their course of study out of interest, 43 per cent considered themselves motivated to work for this reason, while 18 per cent wanted to be done with university as quickly as possible. Seventeen per cent wanted to "earn some money at last" and 11 per cent wanted to put an end to financial dependence.

More than half (51 per cent) were orientated by their own demands on themselves, 39 per cent by those of others and only one per cent were orientated by the performance of parents and brothers or sisters.

Close to half the parents encouraged their children at university when they had failed, one-third showed disappointment and five per cent were either indifferent or withdrew their financial support.

More than two-thirds of the students felt equal to the demands placed on them and 71 per cent had no problem with exams.

More than 70 per cent were spurred on and redoubled their efforts after poor marks.

Gerda Neumann

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 16 November 1981)

Vandals stay on attack

Vandalism in schools costs the nation millions every year. And the bill is growing.

In 1971 the city of Düsseldorf paid DM265,000 to repair schools. Now it pays more than DM1.4m a year, an increase of 500 per cent.

Why? Psychologists blame classroom conflict, scholastic overtaxing, lack of possibility for "self-realisation" and "self-affirmation."

The older the pupils, the greater the destructiveness. The bigger the school the greater the vandalism. The problem is greatest in the huge schools where students are most anonymous.

Essen alone had to pay more than DM1m in 1980 in repairs Oberhausen paid more than DM500,000 — 25 per cent more than the previous year. Duisburg paid out DM1m in the school year 1978/70.

Overall damage for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia is estimated at DM10m, a conservative estimate, say insiders.

School administrations are now trying to fight the problem as well as they can.

In Oberhausen, for instance, students are given pamphlets saying: "You are only harming yourself with this vandalism. Today it is your parents whose taxes pay for this pointless destruction — tomorrow it will be you."

Hannes-Bruno Kammertöns

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 November 1981)

MINORITY GROUPS

Increasingly self-aware gipsies fight back against prejudice

[Pre]judice against Romanies is still [w]idespread. They are reputed to be [c]rude and dishonest. Gipsies are [said] to be alien and to have swarthy [comp]lexions and black hair.

[Gip]sies are tramps and hawkers. They [...]nd steal. One need go no further [tha]n April 1981 Bonn police report [fo]r confirmation of such prejudices.

[Th]e plain clothes branch began to [...], given the unusual increase in [the n]umber of thefts from handbags, [whe]ther they might in any way be con[nected] with the presence of a group of [gipsie]s," the report blithely said.

[Gips]ies, after all, are work-shy, social [...] scroungers, live on their family [allowan]ces, yet drive large cars and wear [...] gold rings on each finger.

[In] the past two years or so these pre[judice]s have been joined by another, the [fact] that gipsies are fighting back. They insist on being called Romanies, [gipsy] being a term of abuse.

[The]y have developed a new sense of [self-aw]areness and of solidarity above [and be]yond the immediate family circle. [They] are also aggressively championing [their c]ause in public, backed by a na[tionw]ide organisation.

[In] 1979 they held a major demonstra[tion a]t what used to Belsen concentra[tion c]amp. Their most prominent guest [was Mada]me Simone Veil, Speaker of the [Europe]an Assembly.

[Las]t year 13 Romanies went on hun[ger s]trike at the former Dachau concen[tratio]n camp, near Munich, because "35 years of injustice there is no [w]ay open to us," as their leader [Roman]i Rose, a Heidelberg businessman, [...]

[In] April 1981 the third international [Roman]y congress was held in Göttingen, [follow]ed in early September by the latest [spectacu]lar move in Tübingen.

[Som]e 20 Romanies besieged for eight [days] a cellar full of university archives [s]uspected of containing the Third [Reich's] gipsy records.

[The]y demanded and got a transfer of [th]e 20,000 documents (files, fami[ly tree]s, police photos and reports) [compile]d by the Racial Hygiene Institute [in Berl]in to the Federal Archives in [Koblenz].

[This] documentation, they claimed, [proves] that Third Reich genocide result[ing in] the extermination of half a mil[lion gi]psies was based from the outset [on raci]al motives.

[Betw]een 1937 and 1942 purportedly [scienti]fic staff of the Racial Hygiene In[stitute] compiled records of at least [...] Romanies.

[The]y measured the maximum length [of their] heads, the width from ear to ear, [the sh]ape and width of nose, category [...] and shape of face.

[Hair] was classified as either plain, [slightl]y wavy, long wavy, close wavy, [cr]inkly, soft or coarse. Faces were [classifi]ed as either round, oval, very long, [...] pointed, birdlike or shaped like a [...] arms.

[The]y measured the length of gipsies' [...], the circumference of their [...], the size of their behinds, the co[lour] of their skin and their figures [...] small, short, tall, fat, thin and [...] permutations).

[The] overall impression they made was [...]dexed under headings such as ungipsylike, slightly, predominantly, genuine gipsy.

Their tendency towards vagrancy was categorised as either strong, moderate, not yet apparent or opposed to the idea.

Their outward appearance came under the headings smart, flashy, slovenly or down and out.

Careful attention was paid to family trees, with clients being classified as full-blooded gipsies, half-gipsies, quarter and eighth-gipsies.

The findings of the Racial Hygiene Institute were the basis on which gipsies were sent to concentration camps and subjected to forcible sterilisation, mutilation and death.

Yet Romanies have seldom been awarded reparation payments or pensions. The view taken by administrative authorities and courts in the Federal Republic of Germany is that they were not victims of Nazi racial madness.

In the Third Reich Romanies are said only to have been apprehended by the police as part of their general work in fighting and preventing crime.

Armed with the overwhelming evidence in the gipsy records, the Romany Association hopes the Bonn government will now meet their demand and acknowledge that the Third Reich committed genocide in respect of the European Romany community.

The government ought, the association feels, to be duty bound to acknowledge a special responsibility towards surviving members of the community.

For 35 years the gipsy records were said to have been lost. The story of how they were finally unearthed and transferred to the Federal Archives in Koblenz is an incredible one.

It features Hermann Arnold, a Landau doctor, who until 1979 was the Bonn government's special adviser on Romanies and a member of the defunct gipsy council of the Family Affairs Ministry. In 1958 Professor Arnold published a scientific work on vagrants in the Palatinate. In 1967 a published another work on the fertility of gipsies, half-gipsies and other social outcasts.

In 1978 he claimed to have taken over the records from a former staff member of the Racial Hygiene Institute.

This was a slight exaggeration. They were already part of the library of the department of anthropology at Mainz University and in the archives of Tübingen University.

There they formed part of the stock in trade of Sophie Erhardt, 72, a professor or anthropology who was well aware how valuable the material was.

I spent three-and-a-half years working for Dr Ritter's research unit in Berlin, she wrote to the head of the Federal Archives, and am well aware of the origin of the material, probably as the only close associate dating back to those days.

Dr Ritter was head of the Racial Hygiene Institute. In 1942 Frau Erhardt assessed the material in a magazine entitled *Volk und Rasse.*

Gipsies, she wrote, are a primitive nation, primitive in their activities and in their aspirations.

Thirty years after the Second World War Frau Erhardt was still able, in a German state that refuses to accept communist Post Office staff and train drivers as civil servants, to claim a bona fide research interest in the files.

For years she was able to use the gipsy records, with financial backing from the Scientific Research Association, Bonn, for her project on population genetics in respect of the gipsy community.

The Romany Association has filed proceedings against Frau Erhardt, who has now retired as professor of anthropology at Tübingen University, on charges of aiding and abetting genocide.

But the Romanies are not expecting the case to go in their favour. They feel sure Frau Erhardt will have destroyed any material that might have told against her.

Besides, similar bids to have Robert Ritter, her Third Reich boss, brought to book proved a failure.

Romani Rose speaks for a community of 50.000 people when he says that: "They discriminate against us, they persecute and humiliate us, and it's the same in the East as it is in the West."

Romany demands for national status, for decent housing, for a decent environment, for vocational training opportunities and decent schooling have been to little effect.

To this day their lives are a constant struggle against discrimination. The association's latest complaint is against official forms used in Baden-Württemberg.

Forms used by the state youth authorities have reverted to categorising applicants as gipsies. In cased where a lost identity card is reported the form-filler is required to include under the heading "other names" the applicant's ZN, an abbreviation for *Zigeunername,* or gipsy name.

EPD, the press service of the German Protestant Church, Frankfurt, in June checked 323 German history and social studies school textbools.

"What do you know about communists, gipsies and negroes?" one book asked. Another included an ABC that under the letter Z grouped together *Zechbrüder, Zigeuner, Zugereiste, Zuhälter* and *Zwitter.*

They are, roughly, boozers, gipsies, outsiders, pimps and hermaphrodites.

None of the textbooks examined were found to justice to incomplete historical research into mass murder and crimes of infamy in the Third Reich or to deal with pressing social problems with reference to authentic statements by people concerned.

In autumn 1980 a course on minorities, with special reference to gipsies, was held at evening classes in Friedberg, Hesse. The 11 people who took part in the course included an official of the Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden and two Frankfurt police officers responsible for gipsy crimes.

The police officers brought with them police files and break-in equipment typical of gipsies. The Bundeskriminalamt officer, or so the Romany Association claims, said the behaviour of gipsy clans was typical of a criminal association. Klaus Thüsing, a Social Democratic member of the Bonn Bundestag, has been dubbed Gipsy Baron for his efforts to find housing for a 53-member gipsy family sranded in Bonn.

Because the local authorities were unwilling to help them he issued them with a document authenticating their names and domicile in Bonn.

This upset the police, who preferred charges against him for usurping local authority responsibilities. The general public was also upset; anonymous letters came in his mail.

They called him the Red Gipsy and asked what right he had to support the criminal gipsies. He deserved a good hiding, one writer commented in a letter full of spelling mistakes.

The Bonn authorities were unable to find either housing or a camp site. They were even prepared to provide the gipsy clan with caravans if only they would go away.

Gipsies may no longer camp at the fairground in Cannstadt, Stuttgart. The police cleared them out in July 1980. Romanies who were evicted tell an anecdote that was reprinted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* at the time.

A gipsy confronted the police and asked what difference there was between what was happening to them in Stuttgart and the treatment meted out to them in Auschwitz.

"Nowadays," a police officer commented, "you can choose your own gas."

Hartmut Schergel

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 14 November 1981)

Romanies in the Third Reich

Ten final-year students at a Cologne *Gymnasium,* or high school, have won a prize and DM 1,000 in cash for an essay on everyday life in the Third Reich. The fate of the gipsies was their topic.

"The fate of the gipsies under national socialism," they wrote, was, both in percentage terms and in terms of blood and gore, on a par with that of the Jews.

"To this day gipsies are viewed as outcasts. Laws ought to be passed to help improve their lot."

The idea of entering for the competition, first held on the initiative of President Heinemann in 1973, was that of their history master, Willi Foerster, who helped them to carry out their project.

Having decided to deal with the oppression and persecution of Jews in Cologne during the Third Reich, the students set out to find material.

They first made contact with Romanies at a platform debate in the Liberal Centre. They were readily allowed to consult the state archives in Düsseldorf and the municipal archives in Cologne.

The records they checked included those of the Düsseldorf Gestapo. Literature was evaluated, people were interviewed. Findings were reviewed at weekly meetings.

After about four months's work the 83-page report was ready. It won third prize in a nationwide contest.

The jury received 2,172 individual and group entries from 12,843 11- to 21-year-olds. The competition is now held under the aegis of President Carstens.

The students planned to spend their award money on an evening out at the theatre and a night on the town. What was left would be donated to a charitable association that dealt with the subject of their essay.

Two fourth prizes, each worth DM500, and two fifth prizes, worth DM200, were also won by entries from schools in or near Cologne.

Wolfgang Brüser

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 27 November 1981)

Parks in German

Is Germany a country of parks as well? Indeed it is. There is the magnificent Englischer Garten in Munich, the blossoming gardens around the river Alster in Hamburg, the flower beds of the German Federal Garden Show in the capital, Bonn, situated on the Rhine, and over a thousand other parks including whole forests. Again and again the landscape thickens to a park. Where a park transcends the borders of a town and takes over the woody hills both architects and gardeners sail with the wind. A good example is the Gruga Park in Essen, in the Ruhr area: it was laid out in 1929 and comprises waterworks, a botanic garden and exhibition halls. Or the Wilhelmshoehe mountain park at Kassel: in its midst is the residence built in 1786 which was temporarily occupied by Napoleon III. Or Ludwigsburg on the Neckar w baroque palace and park and a fairy-tale garden. The beautiful on the Island of Mainau on Lak Constance, on the other hand, a different kind: here the Swed Count Bernadotte looks after hi gardens with Mediterranean ve tation. Why not make a tour thr the parks of Germany?





Ludwigsburg

Gruga-Park/Essen

